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Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination
and the "Diversity" Defense
Tanya Katerf Herndndez*
For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie-deliberate,
contrived and dishonest-but the myth, persistent, persuasive and
unrealistic.'
With the growing racial and ethnic diversity of the U.S. population
and workforce,2 scholars have begun to address the ways in which coalition
building across groups not only will continue to be necessary but also will
become even more complex.3 Recent scholarship has focused on analyz-
* Professor of Law & Justice Frederick Hall Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law-
Newark. A heartfelt thanks to all the following colleagues who read earlier versions of this
Article: Richard Banks, Taunya Lovell Banks, Dorothy Brown, Devon Carbado, Anani
Dzidzienyo, Angelo Falcon, Carlos Gonzalez, Mitu Gulati, Cheryl Harris, Alan Hyde, Jerry
Kang, Emma Coleman Jordan, Kevin Johnson, Beverly Moran, Rachel F. Moran, Suzanne
Oboler, James Pope, Miriam Jimenez Roman, Terry Smith, John Valery White, and Adrien
Wing. I was also greatly benefited by being able to present this research as a work-in-
progress at Fordham Law School, George Washington Law School, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity Law School, University of Minnesota Law School, Stanford Law School, Univer-
sity of Western Cape Rulci/Lat Crit Colloquium, and the Latin American Studies Associa-
tion 2006 Annual Congress. I also thank my research assistants Toan Tran and Mark Jaffe
for truly superb research work. Most importantly, I dedicate this Article to my mother,
Norma Cecilia Rol6n, for her courage as a truth teller about racial bias and discrimination
wherever she sees it. Any shortcomings are my own.
I President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at Yale University (June 11,
1962), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+
Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03YaleO6111962.htm.
2 See Mitra Toosi, A Century of Change: The Labor Force, 1950-2050, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., May 2002, at 15, 15-16, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/O5/art2full.
pdf (reporting U.S. Department of Labor projections that almost half of the workforce of
2050 will be non-White and non-Anglo, with 24% Latino, 14% African American, and 11%
Asian or Pacific Islander).
I See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks and Asians in Mis-
sissippi Masala, Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 ASIAN L.J. 7 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson,
The Struggle for Civil Rights: The Need for and Impediments to, Political Coalitions
Among and Within Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759 (2003); Rogelio A. Lasso, Some
Potential Casualties of Moving Beyond the Black/White Paradigm To Build Racial Coali-
tions, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 81 (2005); Robyn K. Mallett, Stacey Sinclair
& Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, What Intergroup Relations Research Can Tell Us About Coalition
Building, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 5 (2005); George A. Martinez, African-
Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19
UCLA CHICANO-LATINo L. REV. 213 (1998); Mary Romero, Afterword: Historicizing and
Symbolizing a Racial Ethnic Identity: Lessons for Coalition Building with a Social Justice
Agenda, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1599 (2000); Victor C. Romero, Rethinking Minority Coa-
lition Building: Valuing Self-Sacrifice, Stewardship, and Anti-Subordination, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 823 (2005); Susan Taing, Lost in the Shuffle: The Failure of the Pan-Asian Coalition
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ing how best to promote effective coalition building.' Thus far, scholars
have not examined what that growing racial and ethnic diversity will mean
in the context of individual racial and ethnic discrimination claims. What
will antidiscrimination litigation look like when all the parties involved
are non-White5 but nonetheless plaintiffs allege that a racial hierarchy
exists and they are not necessarily interested in the group-politics agenda
of coalition building?6 This Article focuses on the implications of increased
diversity for the operation of employment discrimination law.
For instance, in a pro se petition alleging employment discrimination,'
Mr. Olumuyiwa, a Nigerian security guard, asserted that he and African
American security guards were hired at a lower wage ($7.00 per hour) than
Latino and Yugoslavian employees ($14.00 per hour) and received fewer
hours than did other guards at the discretion of the Hispanic supervisor,
who said he did not like the plaintiff because he was Nigerian. The su-
pervisor also made overtly discriminatory remarks, such as "Why is your
black-ass sleeping here?! I am going to deduct two hours pay from your
black-ass paycheck!" and "We Hispanics run this office!" Because the
rest of the management personnel were also Latino, the plaintiff felt that
they condoned the supervisor's poor conduct. In that context, a plaintiff
like Mr. Olumuyiwa is likely to be most concerned with having any harms
he has experienced at the hands of a workplace racial hierarchy addressed
before considering the importance of political coalitions with the ethnic
To Advance the Interests of Southeast Asian Americans, 16 LA RAZA L.J. 23 (2005);
Reynaldo A. Valencia, What If You Were First and No One Cared: The Appointment of Al-
berto Gonzales and Coalition Building Between Latinos and Communities of Color, 12
WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 21 (2005); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the
Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63
LA. L. REV. 717 (2003); Note, The Ties That Bind: Coalitions and Governance Under
Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2621 (2004).
4 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, African American and Latinalo Cooperation in Challenging
Racial Profiling, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS: LATINOS, BLACKS, AND AFRO-LATINOS
247, 258 (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler eds., 2005) [hereinafter NEITHER ENEMIES
NOR FRIENDS] ("Because African Americans and Latinas/os suffer common harms from
racial profiling in law enforcement, they would seem natural allies in seeking to eliminate
the practice. However, cooperation between the African American and Latina/o communi-
ties in the United States faces formidable barriers.").
I Whiteness is treated in this Article as a social construct with which a society bestows
favored status and class privilege upon the individuals referred to as White in varying con-
texts. See David Roediger, Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of "White Ethnics" in
the United States, in TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS,
AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 181, 181-98 (David Roediger ed., 1994) (describing white-
ness as a context-based category whose assignment is influenced by class and citizenship).
Because whiteness is not considered a biological fact in this analysis, the Article's discus-
sion of inter-ethnic discrimination also includes cases in which non-Anglo immigrants with
fair skin are treated as non-White because they are viewed with less favor than White-Anglo
citizens.
6 Jos6 E. Cruz, Interminority Relations in Legislative Settings: The Case of African
Americans and Latinos, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 229, 230
(describing instances of disinterest in the formation of coalitions).
I Olumuyiwa v. Harvard Prot. Corp., 1999 WL 529553 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1999).
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group members who are comparatively advantaged by that hierarchy. Un-
fortunately, neither the literature about coalition building nor the em-
ployment discrimination jurisprudence is presently capable of addressing
the problems of inter-ethnic discrimination plaintiffs whose claims are not
as extreme in their manifestation of overt Latino anti-Black sentiment.8
As this Article will explicate, non-White racial hierarchies appear
opaque to decisionmakers and other legal actors, who find it difficult to
recognize the indicators of discrimination. Agents of discrimination are
perceived as uniformly White-Anglos 9 and all incidents are envisioned as
having a White-versus-non-White dynamic. 0 For instance, the Equal Em-
8I d. at *6 (granting plaintiff's motion to amend complaint).
9 The term "White-Anglo" is used in this Article to distinguish those viewed as White
in the United States from the many Latinos who also appear Caucasian. In analyzing the
interplay of race and ethnicity in employment discrimination cases, it is important to be
specific about the background of the parties. For that same reason the term "African
American" is used to distinguish those viewed as Black in the United States from the many
Latinos who are also of African descent living in the United States. It is useful to be ethni-
cally specific in referring to populations of African descent in order to provide a more nuanced
account of Latino racism that does not conflate identifiable Afro-Latinos with Latinos of
more prominent European ancestry.
10 There is a growing body of literature that discusses the various ways in which the
legal system manifests a view of racism as solely involving African Americans and White-
Anglos. The focus of that literature has been upon illustrating how the Black/White binary
obfuscates the operation of White racism against many other racial groups. This Article
instead focuses upon how the binary obfuscates the racial attitudes of racial group mem-
bers themselves. See, e.g., Juan Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The
"Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 10 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1257 (1997) (dis-
cussing how the Black/White binary focus upon White racism against Blacks does not
fully explain White racism against other racial groups); see also Christopher David Ruiz
Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding The Language of
Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, La-
tino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 261, 261, 268 (1998) (defining
"racial dualism" as "the tendency of courts to view civil rights discourse in terms of Blacks
and Whites to the exclusion of Browns and other people of color" which thereby "makes
Latinos and their problems in the workplace invisible"); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian
American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative
Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1267 (1993) ("To focus on the black-white racial paradigm
is to misunderstand the complicated racial situation in the United States."); Adrienne D.
Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 695, 696 (1996)
("An historical assessment of the relationship of other groups of color to a black/white
paradigm reveals the paradigm as not only undescriptive and inaccurate, but debilitating
for legal analysis, as well as civil rights oriented organizing."); Angela P. Harris, Foreword:
The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 775 & n.169 (1994) ("Race-
crits' understanding of 'race' and 'racism' might also benefit from looking beyond the
struggle between black and white. African American theorists have, until now, dominated
CRT, and African American experiences have been taken as a paradigm for the experiences
of all people of color."); Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our
Time, 20 Soc. JUST. 22 (1993); Rachel F. Moran, Foreword: Demography and Distrust:
The Latino Challenge to Civil Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8
LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (1995); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just
Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957-59 (1995); William R. Tamayo,
When the "Coloreds" Are Neither Black nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights
Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 7-9 (1995); Frank Wu, Neither Black nor
White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 225, 248
(1995) ("The time has come to consider groups that are neither black nor white in the ju-
2007]
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ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") fails to collect any data about
the race of those individuals who are agents of discrimination and racial
harassment in the workplace. While this is presumably because the EEOC
targets discrimination by employers, not individuals, the absence of ra-
cial data about the employers' representatives implicitly furthers the nar-
rative that racism in the United States is solely a White/non-White prob-
lem. One EEOC attorney has even stated that there has been a "reluctance to
bring cases against other minorities."" This reluctance exists even though
the EEOC is beginning to see more cases in which different racial/ethnic
groups are set against each other in the allocation of job opportunities. 2
Indeed, employers generally demonstrate a preference for particular racial or
ethnic groups in the labor market beyond a mere economic preference for
low-wage immigrant workers. 3 For instance, among immigrant workers,
employers prefer those with lighter skin tone. 4
risprudence of race .... Race is conceptualized as breaking down into two all-encompassing
and mutually exclusive categories, black and white."); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fif-
teenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Bi-
nary, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1181, 1196 (1997) (book review).
" Miriam Jordan, Blacks vs. Latinos at Work: More African Americans Claim They Are
Passed Over for Hispanics in Hiring, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at B 1 (quoting EEOC
regional attorney Anna Park).
'
2 See, e.g., EEOC v. Cloughtery Packing Co., No. 2:04-cv-08051-GAF-PLA (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts (settling discrimination
claim for $110,000 where Black applicants alleged they were denied employment so that pork
packing employer could hire Latino applicants instead); EEOC v. Raytheon Technical Servs.,
No. CV 02-00735 (D. Haw. Nov. 5, 2004), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/
settlements/index.html (settling discrimination claim for $165,000 where Black paint contract-
or allegedly was denied employment in favor of Asian/Pacific Islander paint contractors);
EEOC v. Pac. Micr. Corp. No. 02-0015 (D. N. Mar. I. Mar. 3 2004), available at http://www.
eeoc.govflitigation/settlements/index.html (settling discrimination claim for $400,000 where
more than forty employees of Filipino origin had been replaced by employees from countries
other than the Philippines); see also Jordan, supra note 11, at BI (describing $180,000
EEOC settlement with Zenith National Insurance Corp., based upon the allegation that ten
Black applicants were denied a position in the mailroom in favor of a Latino applicant with
no mailroom experience); W. Matt Meyer, Here Is a Twist-Firm Is Fined for Hiring Too
Many Hispanics and Not Enough Black and White Workers, Pictsweet To Amend for
Prejudicial Hiring, HisP. VISTA, July 14, 2003, at I (describing a settlement agreement
between United Foods Inc. and the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs for discrimination in systematically excluding African American and
White job applicants in favor of hiring Latinos). The preference for Latino workers over
African Americans may also contribute to the disparate unemployment rates that each
group suffers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the unemployment rate among
African Americans is rising twice as fast as that of Whites. In contrast, overall Latino unem-
ployment is in line with that of the nation as a whole and Latinos have fared better with an
expansion in manufacturing jobs. Louis Uchitelle, Blacks Lose Better Jobs Faster as Middle-
Class Work Drops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at Al.
'" PHILIP Moss & CHRIS TILLY, STORIES EMPLOYERS TELL: RACE, SKILL, AND HIRING
IN AMERICA 116-17 (2001). The authors report racial distinctions made by employers re-
garding the desirability of different racial/ethnic group employees in the Russell Sage Founda-
tion Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, as demonstrated by respondents identifying
Latinos six times more frequently than African Americans as preferred workers. This atti-
tude is reflected in one respondent's statement that "Spanish people are more willing to work.
They are willing to work longer hours. I think the ones that I've known are very dedicated
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Similarly, despite the fact that a significant level of overtly anti-Black
Latino gang violence occurs in the state of California; Chicago, Illinois;
and most recently in Perth Amboy, New Jersey, 5 the FBI's statistical col-
lection of hate-crime incidents fails to provide a mechanism for assessing
the number of Latino offenders. Instead, the FBI tabulates suspected of-
fenders as White, Black, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific
Islander, Multi-Racial, and Unknown. 6 Thus, the existence of Latino hate
crime perpetrators is statistically invisible despite news reports of its oc-
currence. 7 In turn, the notion that hate crime is solely a White/non-White
phenomenon is maintained. 8
to their jobs." See also John J. Betancur, Framing the Discussion of African American-Latino
Relations: A Review and Analysis, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at
159, 160 (summarizing the literature detailing employer preferences for one racial group
over another with a racial ordering of segmented employment roles by status and wage).
t4 Joni Hersch, Profiling the New Immigrant Worker: The Effects of Skin Color and
Height (Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=927038 (noting that a 2003 study of 8600 recent immigrants found that light-
skinned immigrants in the United States make more money on average than those with darker
complexions, even when controlling for race and nationality).
15 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Effort To Re-Integrate Jail Sparks New Disturbance,
L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2000, at B4 (reporting three days of rioting after Latino inmates,
acting on orders from the Mexican Mafia prison gang, began attacking African American
inmates, prompting prison officials to segregate the inmates by race, after which the Latino
inmates refused to be re-integrated with African American inmates); Suzanne C. Russell,
Perth Amboy Gang Tensions Worry Parents, HOME NEWS TRIB., Apr. 7, 2004 (reporting
harassment of African American athletes by a Dominican gang of students known as the
"D Block").
16 See FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS OF HATE CRIME (1995), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
hatecm.htm.
P7 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Kareem Fahim, Racial Slur Preceded Slashing of 3
in Manhattan, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at Metro 37 (reporting attack on three
Asian men by three Hispanic men wielding a box cutter and yelling a derogatory term for
Chinese people); Robert Siegel & Melissa Block, All Things Considered: California Pris-
ons on Alert After Weekend Violence (National Public Radio broadcast Feb. 6, 2006) (re-
porting two weekend race riots between Latino and African American inmates, which cul-
minated in prison officials segregating the inmates by race and Latino inmates sending
prison officials a letter that stated, "No disrespect ... but if blacks come in the dorms we
will fight."); News Brief, Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, Los Angeles Hate
Crime Leads to Hijacked Bus, May 3, 2001, available at http://hatemonitor.csusb.edu/
NewsHeadlines/may01_newsbriefs.html#LA%2OHate%20Crime (reporting shooting of Afri-
can American by Latino who stated he did not like African American men associating with
Latina women); see also JAMES E. JOHNSON & BILL LANN LEE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY
ET AL., NATIONAL CHURCH ARSON TASK FORCE (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/church arson/arson98.html (reporting arrest of Hispanic suspect for burning an African
American house of worship). In addition, some municipal arrest records reflect the exis-
tence of Latino hate crime perpetrators. See Brian Levin, A Dream Deferred, 20 J. INTER-
GROUP REL. 3, 22 (1993) (indicating that 42% of those arrested for racial hate crimes in
Los Angeles in 1992 were Latino, and 9% of those arrested for racial hate crimes in Boston
in 1991 were Latino).
8 See Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 965, 970 (1995) (describing the ways in which the relative lack of positive public iden-
tity and legitimacy of Latinos creates an image of racial conflict as existing solely between
African Americans and White-Anglos).
2007]
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As Eric Yamamoto notes, the traditional civil rights approach focuses
on conflicts with Whites and not with other communities of color. 9 He also
observes that the focus on White-Anglos underappreciates the extent to
which inter-ethnic conflicts can quickly escalate into intergroup contro-
versies because of the deep and often unacknowledged racial grievances. 20
Yamamoto recommends that in order to build more effective coalitions,
civil rights attorneys should envision racial justice practice as something
more than the enforcement of civil rights laws. They should instead de-
ploy interracial justice inquiries in the venue of grassroots organizing in
order to acknowledge how racial groups harm one another. Yamamoto's
work, however, does not examine the focus of this Article: the develop-
ment of a conceptual framework for effectively presenting and understand-
ing inter-ethnic discrimination claims with the goal of disrupting the ju-
diciary's singular focus on White/non-White discrimination.
This Article treats "inter-ethnic discrimination" as discrimination
among non-White racial and ethnic groups. The concept is defined broadly
to include discrimination among members of different ethnic subgroups,
such as discrimination by Puerto Ricans against Dominicans or by White
Latinos against Afro-Latinos. Inter-ethnic discrimination is viewed ex-
pansively in order to depict the many ways non-White ethnic groups and
subgroups are complicit in maintaining racial hierarchy in the workplace.
Thus, the classic disparate treatment employment discrimination cases, in
which White employers exclude or differentially treat particular racial/eth-
nic groups, are not part of this examination of inter-ethnic discrimination. 2'
Furthermore, the dearth of reported cases involving systemic disparate
treatment and disparate impact in the inter-ethnic context precludes the
19 ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 38 (1999).
20 See Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379, 386 (Francisco Val-
des et al. eds., 2002).
21 See supra note 12 (detailing cases in which the EEOC has successfully settled alle-
gations of White employers awarding job opportunities to one racial/ethnic group at the
expense of another). While the EEOC often is able to settle classic disparate treatment cases
involving White employers, plaintiffs have met with judicial resistance when they allege
disparate treatment by White employers who rely on word-of-mouth hiring methods that
disproportionately exclude African Americans while overwhelmingly including other ra-
cial/ethnic groups. But see EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 298-99
(7th Cir. 1991) (observing that exclusionary word-of-mouth hiring methods can support a
finding of discrimination when an employer is actively involved in soliciting employees for
word-of-mouth applicant recommendations). The Seventh Circuit later upheld a judgment
of discrimination by a Polish employer who used word-of-mouth recruitment practices that
benefited Polish and Latino employees while completely excluding African American ap-
plicants. EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994).
This result accords with the general understanding that word-of-mouth recruitment policies
creating a predominantly White workforce or job category can establish a discrimination
violation. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980); Barnett
v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 42
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specific examination of those forms of discrimination in this Article's analy-
sis of inter-ethnic discrimination. 22
The majority of inter-ethnic employment discrimination claims ap-
pear to be those in which Latinos are involved in turn as victims and as
agents of individual disparate treatment in the workplace. 23 Latinos and
individual disparate treatment cases are thus the focus of this exploration
of inter-ethnic discrimination. 24 This focus is warranted by demographic
projections that one in four job seekers by the year 2020 will be the child
of a Latino immigrant and that Latino workers will increase their repre-
sentation in the workforce from the current rate of 12% to 25% by the year
2050.25 Latino-owned businesses have also increased 232% between 1987
and 1997.26 In 1997 alone, Latino-owned businesses employed 1,492,773
people.27 Furthermore, as the fastest-growing 28 ethnic/racial minority29 in
the United States, Latinos have been celebrated in the public discourse as
a multiracial people incapable of racial discrimination.3" Examining La-
22 In one noteworthy systemic disparate treatment inter-ethnic discrimination case, the
Seventh Circuit held that the passive use of word-of-mouth recruitment by the Korean owner
of a janitorial and cleaning services company could not in and of itself give rise to an in-
ference of intentional discrimination in the absence of evidence that the owner was biased
in favor of Koreans or prejudiced against any group underrepresented in its work force. EEOC
v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993). Although this case has been assailed
for underestimating the discriminatory effects of intra-ethnic group preferences in the work-
place, it should be noted that unlike the disposition of the emerging individual disparate
treatment inter-ethnic cases analyzed in this Article, Consolidated Service does not fore-
close the possibility that racial discriminatory intent might exist simply because the com-
pany owner is Korean. Indeed, the court took pains to note that the assessment of the case
would have been different if evidence of racial animus had been presented or if the owner
had been actively engaged in deploying the word-of-mouth hiring method rather than pas-
sively benefiting from his employees' self-initiated use of the method. Id. at 236.
23 See infra note 125 and accompanying text (detailing the inter-ethnic employment
discrimination cases in LexisNexis and Westlaw).
24 See infra notes 125-131 and accompanying text (describing the nature of an individual
disparate treatment case and its importance to the emerging inter-ethnic discrimination cases).
25 Employment: Second-Generation Latinos To Exert Major Workforce Influence, Pew
Report Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 199, at A-7 (Oct. 15, 2003); see also RAKESH KOCH-
HAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., LATINO LABOR REPORT 2006: STRONG GAINS IN EMPLOYMENT
(2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/70.pdf.
26 U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., MINORITIES IN BUSINESS 1 (1999), available at http://www.
sba.gov/advo/stats/min.pdf.2 71 Id. at 23.
2 8 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH
2002, at 20-545 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-545.pdf
(reporting that the nation's Hispanic population grew much faster than the population as a
whole, increasing from 35.3 million in 2000 to 38.8 million in 2002, and constituted 12.5%
of the 2000 census population, excluding the 3.8 million residents of Puerto Rico). The Latino
population is projected to constitute one-quarter of the U.S. population by 2050. Dick
Kirschten, Hispanics: Beyond the Myths, NAT'L. J., Aug. 14, 1999, at 2350, 2351.
29 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1997) (describing how Latinos can be positioned to be both
an ethnic group and a racial group).
3o See Silvio Torres-Saillant, Inventing the Race: Latinos and the Ethnoracial Penta-
gon, 1 LATINO STUD. J. 123 (2003) (describing how Latinos take pride in being enlight-
ened about race relations because they are a "racially mixed" people); Silvio Torres-Saillant,
2007]
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tino bias may tell us much about the ability of legal actors to recognize
and articulate the harm of inter-ethnic discrimination in a legal system
steeped in an understanding of discrimination as solely a White/non-White
phenomenon.
In the emerging body of inter-ethnic discrimination cases, Latinos
figure prominently in allegations of employment discrimination in ways that
contradict the image in public discourse of a multiracial people who do
not racially discriminate. In these cases, judges seem unable to appreci-
ate Latino manifestations of bias for two reasons. First, judges appear to
be unfamiliar with Latin American racial ideology and how Latinos in
the United States express racial bias. Second, they impute to diverse
workplaces a shield against discriminatory treatment claims. This is best
exemplified by one judge's explicit claim that "[d]iversity in an employer's
staff undercuts an inference of discriminatory intent."'" Such a presump-
tion both contravenes established employment discrimination doctrine and
impairs a thorough inquiry into inter-ethnic employment discrimination
claims. Indeed, it effectively operates as a defense to discrimination in indi-
vidual disparate treatment cases when an accusation of inter-ethnic dis-
crimination is at issue.
This Article uses the term "diversity defense" to describe the way in
which legal actors view a racially "diverse" workplace as the equivalent
of a racially harmonious workplace, thereby failing to recognize inci-
dents of discrimination and the relevant caselaw. Viewing all people of
color as the same and overlooking the particular histories of racial animus
within and across different ethnic groups can cause a perceived equiva-
lence of workplace diversity and racial harmony. The lack of judicial knowl-
edge about non-White racial hierarchies generally, and Latino ethnic/racial
differences and attitudes specifically, facilitates the inclination to con-
struct a diversity defense. Then, in a circular fashion, the diversity de-
fense hinders judicial awareness of Latino heterogeneity and inter-ethnic
strife. In response, this Article proposes a "Multiracial Racism Litigation
Approach" ("MRLA") to enable decisionmakers to identify and address
discrimination in inter-ethnic contexts.
Part I of this Article will present the social science literature illumi-
nating the complexity of racial attitudes among Latinos, which judges gen-
Epilogue: Problematic Paradigms: Racial Diversity and Corporate Identity in the Latino
Community, in LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA 435 (M.M. Suarez-Orozco & M.M. Paez eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Torres-Saillant, Problematic Paradigms] (discussing the dangers of "current
assertions of a harmonious panethnic Latino identity"); see also JOHN FRANCIS BURKE, MES-
TIZO DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF CROSSING BORDERS (2002) (arguing that the Latino
"mestizaje" mixed race experience offers an ideal model for fostering unity); Lynette Cle-
metson, Hispanic Population Is Rising Swiftly, Census Bureau Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2003, at A22 ("[Latinos] just don't see the world divided into such stark boxes, and that
has to be a real engine for change." (quoting Roberto Suro, Director of the Pew Hispanic
Institute)).
31 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).
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erally do not appreciate. Part II will analyze the emerging Latino inter-ethnic
employment discrimination cases. These cases demonstrate that judicial
inability to recognize racial discrimination when it occurs in an inter-ethnic
context leads judges to deploy an inappropriate diversity defense to dis-
crimination claims. Part III therefore proposes that legal actors address
the particular litigation needs of inter-ethnic claims through a multiracial
racism lens. The proposed MRLA focuses on how an ethnic/racial group
is advantaged or disadvantaged depending on the context. As such, it is
better able to elucidate and address the harms of inter-ethnic employment
discrimination, without imputing magical powers to the existence of work-
place diversity.
I. LATINO RACIAL ATTITUDES
Before presenting the emerging Latino inter-ethnic discrimination
cases, it is important to explore the social science data about Latino ra-
cial attitudes that judges have overlooked. With a foundation in the social
science literature, one can more clearly appreciate the missteps of the
cases.
A. The Origins of Latino Racism
The manifestation of Latino racism in the United States is the result
of a complex interaction of Latin American/Caribbean racial attitudes and
self-esteem-boosting responses to being racialized as Latinos in the
United States. Most relevant for this analysis of inter-ethnic employment
discrimination is the interplay of Latino anti-Black racial attitudes.32 They
are most relevant because the emerging inter-ethnic Latino cases discussed
herein involve workplace settings in which Latinos are identified as agents
of anti-Black bias and discrimination against African Americans and Afro-
Latinos. Presented with these cases, judges are often unable to recognize
32 Latino anti-Asian bias is an under-studied area that warrants empirical research. Just
a few scholars have begun to address the issue of Asian ethnicity in Latin America. See
JEFFREY LESSER, NEGOTIATING NATIONAL IDENTITY: IMMIGRANTS, MINORITIES AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR ETHNICITY IN BRAZIL (1999); Evelyn Hu Dehart, Chinese Coolie Labour
in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labour or Neo-Slavery?, in THE WAGES OF SLAV-
ERY 67, 68-70 (Michelle Twaddle ed., 1993); Mieko Nishida, Japanese Brazilian Women
and Their Ambiguous Identities: Gender Ethnicity and Class in Sao Paulo (Latin Am. Stud.
Ctr., Univ. of Md., College Park, Working Paper No. 5, 2000). In contrast, prejudice against
those of indigenous ancestry in Latin America is well documented in social science litera-
ture. See, e.g., STRUGGLES FOR SOCIAL RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA (Susan Eva Eckstein &
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley eds., 2002) (detailing the indigenous peoples' struggle against
discrimination in Latin America). However, neither anti-Asian nor anti-indigenous bias has
been implicated in the emerging Latino inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases reported
thus far.
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the details of Latino anti-Black racial discrimination, despite their will-
ingness to entertain claims of anti-Latino bias made by African Americans.33
It is useful to first summarize Latin American and Caribbean per-
spectives about Afro-Latinos, that is, their own Afro-descendants, before
discussing how those perspectives inform Latino attitudes toward African
Americans in the United States. The presentation of Latin American race
ideology is not at all meant to suggest that all Latinos are racist or harbor
these racialized perspectives. Admittedly, group-focused discussions al-
ways run the risk of suggesting an essentialized view of a group.34 This
data about Latino racial perspectives is provided to demonstrate the na-
ture of Latino racial stereotypes of which legal actors in the United States
may otherwise be ignorant and which they must understand in order to
recognize the discriminatory conduct of Latinos who act upon such stereo-
types.35 It is not intended to insinuate that all Latinos think a particular
way.
Racism, in particular anti-Black racism, is a pervasive and historically
entrenched fact of life in Latin America and the Caribbean. Over 90% of
the approximately ten million enslaved Africans brought to the Americas
were taken to Latin America and the Caribbean, whereas only 4.6% were
brought to the United States.36 As such, the historical legacy of slavery is
pervasive in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Latin America and the
Caribbean, as in the United States, lighter skin and European features in-
crease one's chances for socioeconomic advancement, while darker skin and
African or indigenous features severely limit such opportunity and social
3 It may well be that the apparent judicial predisposition to consider the culpability of
Black defendants in anti-Latino bias employment claims is part and parcel of the general
proclivity for more readily accepting the possible culpability of Black defendants in con-
trast to other racial groups. See, e.g., Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of Afri-
can-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 721 (2004). Therefore, while inter-ethnic cases of anti-Latino bias do exist,
they have not thus far led to judicial confusion in the inquiry into discrimination and are
therefore not the subject of this Article. See, e.g., Limes-Miller v. City of Chicago, 773 F.
Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (dismissing claim of Latina plaintiff who failed to show that
her employer's stated reason for layoffs was a pretext for national-origin discrimination in
an inter-ethnic workplace in which plaintiff failed to prove that Blacks were promoted at
higher rates than others).
34 An essentialized approach to understanding groups is marked by the notion that hu-
man identity categories are fixed and exist trans-historically and transculturally. See Cheshire
Calhoun, Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV.
1859, 1863 (1993).
35 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (concluding that an employer's
expressions of stereotypical views about a protected group such as women could be admit-
ted as evidence that an adverse employment decision was impermissibly motivated); see
also Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 95 (1994) (proposing the use of essentialized notions of culture in criminal
law cases for the limited purpose of explaining an individual's state of mind and cultural
influences).
36 Miriam Jimenez Romdn, Un Hombre (Negro) del Pueblo: Josi Celso Barbosa and
the Puerto Rican "Race" Toward Whiteness, 8 CENTRO 8, 12 (1996).
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mobility.37 The poorest socioeconomic class is populated primarily by
Afro-Latinos, while the most privileged class is populated primarily by
Whites; an elastic intermediary socioeconomic standing exists for some
light-skinned (mixed-race) "Mulattos" and "Mestizos."3 For instance, until
the Cuban revolution in 1959, certain occupations used explicit color prefer-
ences to hire Mulattos to the complete exclusion of dark-skinned Afro-
Cubans, based on the premise that Mulattos were superior to dark-skinned
Afro-Cubans, though not of the same status as Whites.39
White supremacy is deeply ingrained and continues into the present.
For example, in research conducted in Puerto Rico during the 1997-1998
academic year, the overwhelming majority of the 187 college students inter-
viewed described "Puerto Ricans who are 'dumb' as having 'dark skin."' 4
Conversely, the same students correlated light skin color with a descrip-
tion of "Puerto Ricans who are physically strong." Such negative perspec-
tives about African ancestry are not limited to college students. In 1988,
when the presiding governor of Puerto Rico publicly stated, "The contri-
bution of the black race to Puerto Rican culture is irrelevant, it is mere
rhetoric," it was in keeping with what social scientists describe as the stan-
dard paradox in Puerto Rico: Puerto Ricans take great pride in the claim
of being the whitest people of the Caribbean islands, while simultaneously
asserting they are not racist. The pride of being a presumably White popula-
tion is a direct reaction to the Puerto Rican understanding that "black people
are perceived to be culturally unrefined and lack ambition."'" The Puerto
Rican example is emblematic of the racial attitudes throughout the Car-
ibbean and Latin America.42
As in the United States, the disparagement of Black identity is not
limited to Mulattos, Mestizos and Whites, but also extends to darker-skinned
Afro-Latinos who can harbor internalized racist norms. The internaliza-
tion manifests itself in a widespread concern among Afro-Latinos with the
degree of pigmentation, width of nose, thickness of lips, and nature of one's
hair-with straight, European hair denominated literally as "good" hair.
37 Tanya Katerf Herndndez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the En-
forcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, a United States-Latin America Comparison, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1121-22 (2002) [hereinafter Herndndez, Multiracial Matrix].38 1d. at 1121-25.
39 Tanya K. Hernndez, An Exploration of the Efficacy of Class-Based Approaches to
Racial Justice: The Cuban Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135 (2000).
40 Ronald E. Hall, A Descriptive Analysis of Skin Color Bias in Puerto Rico: Ecologi-
cal Applications to Practice, 27 J. Soc'Y. & Soc. WELFARE 171, 177-78 (2000).
41 Arlene Torres, La Gran Familia Puertorriquefia "Ej Prieta De Beldd" (The Great
Puerto Rican Family is Really Really Black), in BLACKNESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN: SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION, VOL. II, EASTERN SOUTH
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 285, 297 (Arlene Torres & Norman E. Whitten, Jr. eds.,
1998).
42 Ariel E. Dulitzky, A Region in Denial: Racial Discrimination and Racism in Latin
America, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 41-42 (describing the anti-
Black racism that exists throughout Latin America).
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This concern with European skin and features also influences Afro-Latinos'
assessments of preferred marriage partners. Marrying someone lighter is
called "adelantando la raza" (improving the race) under the theory of "blan-
queamiento" (whitening), which prizes the mixture of races precisely to
help diminish the existence of Afro-Latinos. Even in the midst of Latin
American nationalistic emphasis on having individuals identify solely by
their country of origin rather than by racial ancestry, discursive distinc-
tions are made about the diminished value of Blacks and blackness. In-
deed, it is even common within Latin America and the Caribbean to rank
order the prestige of countries based on a color spectrum in which each
country is racially identified. 3 In this way "nationality is a proxy for race"
that embodies White supremacy." As a result, countries with a large per-
centage of Whites are valued while those with a large percentage of Blacks
are discounted as "less cultured."" The attribution of a racial identity to
countries, with nationality serving as a proxy for race, also permits a
schizophrenic ability to cast racial aspersions about a person's background
without ever openly discussing race. These proxies for race are deeply in-
grained in Latin American/Caribbean culture. 46
It should not be surprising, then, that migrants from Latin America and
the Caribbean travel to the United States with their culture of anti-Black
racism well intact.47 In turn, this facet of Latino culture is transmitted to
some degree to younger generations.48 For instance, in one ethnographic
43 Telephone Interview with Ana Y. Ramos Zayas, Professor of Latino & Hispanic Car-
ibbean Studies, Rutgers Univ. (Mar. 1, 2007); see also Francisco Valdes, Race, Ethnicity,
and Hispanismo in a Triangular Perspective: The "Essential Latinola" and LatCrit The-
ory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305, 326 (2000) (describing the racialization of Latin America and
"the supremacy of whiteness and Eurocentricity in Latina/o racial and ethnic hierarchies -
both in Latin American societies and in Latina/o communities throughout the United States").
One scholar refers to racial identification of countries as "primacism." See Benjamin G.
Davis, International Commercial Online and Offline Dispute Resolution: Addressing Prima-
cism and Universalism, 4 J. AM. ARB. 79, 81 (2005) ("The word primacism is my manner
of describing the situation where race, culture, and nationality are intertwined in such a man-
ner that while one speaks in terms of nationality, in fact, one is describing race (or some
other primary group).").
44 Davis, supra note 43, at 81.
45 Hernindez, Multiracial Matrix, supra note 37, at 1160 ("[T]he examination of the
Latin American context has shown how existing racial disparities and hierarchy are explained
as the result of the 'bad culture' that racial minorities manifest."); see also Paulo de Car-
valho-Neto, Folklore of the Black Struggle in Latin America, 5 LATIN AM. PERSP. 53, 58-
62, 71 (1978) (detailing the ways in which Latin American folklore publicly depicts Blacks
in Latin America as ill-mannered and stupid). "To the prejudiced white man, the black man
has no artistic or literary education." Id. at 62.
46 Telephone Interview with Ana Y. Ramos Zayas, supra note 43.
41 Paula D. McClain et al., Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latino Immigrants'
Views of Black Americans, 68 J. POL. 571 (2006) (documenting how Latino immigrants bring
negative attitudes towards Blacks with them from their countries of origin rather than de-
velop them in the United States after immigrating); Torres-Saillant, Problematic Paradigms,
supra note 30, at 435-55.
41 See Valdes, supra note 43, at 307 (observing the "internal reproduction of white su-
premacy within and among Latinas/os").
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study of Dominican racial identity within the United States, all of the
Dominican preoccupations with skin color and European phenotype honed
in the Dominican Republic were readily apparent among the Dominican
Diaspora in the United States.49 Furthermore, interviews of Dominican cli-
ents at a hair salon in Washington Heights, New.York, demonstrated the
pervasive Latin American/Caribbean racialized denigration of curly Afri-
can hair as "bad" and straight European hair as "good," along with the dis-
taste for dark skin. 50
The inability to perceive Latino racism in the United States stems from
an acceptance in U.S. public discourse of the Latin American myth that
racism does not exist in Latin America 5' and that racism is thus not part
of the Latino migrant legacy across generations. 2 In turn, Latinos and the
scholars who describe their racial attitudes tend to accept the notion that
any anti-Black sentiment expressed by Latinos in the United States is a
consequence of learning the cultural norms of the United States and its
racial paradigm.53 However, a growing social science literature discredits
the premise that Latino racism is a set of behaviors and attitudes only
learned on the United States mainland. 54
B. The Extent of Latino Social Distance from African Americans
The sociological concept of "social distance" measures the social un-
ease that an ethnic or racial group has in interactions with another ethnic
or racial group.55 Social science studies of Latino racial attitudes often indi-
cate a preference for maintaining social distance from African Americans.
And while the social distance level is largest for recent Latin American im-
migrants, more established communities of Latinos in the United States are
also characterized by their social distance from African Americans. For in-
stance, in a 2002 survey of 600 Latinos (two-thirds of whom were Mexican,
the remainder Salvadoran and Colombian) and 600 African Americans in
Houston, Texas, the African Americans had more positive views of Lati-
49 See Ginetta E. B. Candelario, Situating Ambiguity: Dominican Identity Formations
339 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York) (on file with au-
thor).
50 ld. at 360-81.
51 Dulitzky, supra note 42, at 39.
52 See supra text accompanying note 30.
53 See, e.g., TATCHO MINDIOLA, JR. ET AL., BLACK-BROWN RELATIONS AND STEREO-
TYPES 20-29, 37-38 (2002).
54 See Valdes, supra note 43, at 328 ("Latina/o tendencies to valorize whiteness are not
simply a matter of acculturation, or even reacculturation, to the Anglocentric white su-
premacist rule imposed by the United States."); see also Tanya Katerf Herndndez, To Be
Brown in Brazil: Education and Segregation Latin American Style, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 683 (2005) (describing the literature documenting the existence of residen-
tial and educational racial segregation in Latin America).
55 GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE? LATINOS, ASIANS, AND THE NEW BLACK/NONBLACK
DIVIDE 65 (2003).
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nos than vice versa. 6 While a slim majority of U.S.-born Latinos did use
positive identifiers when describing African Americans, only a minority
of foreign-born Latinos did so. One typical foreign-born Latino respon-
dent stated "I just don't trust them .... The men, especially, all use drugs
and they all carry guns . . . -"I It is thus not surprising that this same
study found that, although Latino immigrants live in residential neighbor-
hoods with African Americans in the same proportion as U.S.-born Lati-
nos, 46% of Latino immigrants report almost no interaction with African
Americans whatsoever."8 Similarly, the Los Angeles Survey of Urban Ine-
quality found that recent and intermediate-term Latino immigrants held
the most negative stereotypes of African Americans.59
Furthermore, the social distance of Latinos from African Americans
is consistently reflected in Latino responses to other survey questions. 60
In a 2003 survey of five hundred residents of Durham, North Carolina
(equally divided among Latinos, African Americans, and White-Anglos),
researchers found that Latinos' negative stereotypes of African Ameri-
cans exceed those held by White-Anglos. 6' A 2000 study of residential
segregation found that Latinos reject African Americans as neighbors more
readily than members of other racial groups do.62 In addition, the 1999-
2000 Lilly Survey of American Attitudes and Friendships indicated that
African Americans were the least desirable marriage partners for Latinos,
whereas African Americans are more accepting of intermarriage with Lati-
nos.
63
Similarly, in a 1993 study of intergroup relations, Latinos overwhelm-
ingly responded that they had most in common with Whites and least in
56 MINDIOLA, JR., supra note 53, at 35.
571 d. at 35.
58 Id. at 44-45.
" CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY CHARLES, WON'T You BE My NEIGHBOR? RACE, CLASS, AND
RESIDENCE IN Los ANGELES 161 (2006) (describing the results from the 1992-1994 Los
Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality).
60 Id. at 46.
61 See McClain, supra note 47 (observing that a majority of Latino immigrants in the
study-58.9%-said that few or almost no African Americans are hardworking, 57% said
few if any African Americans could be trusted, and nearly one-third said few if any African
Americans are easy to get along with; for White-Anglos, 9.3% said few African Americans
work hard, 9.6% said African Americans could not be trusted, and 8.4% said African Ameri-
cans were difficult to get along with).
62 Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Neighborhood Racial-Composition Preferences: Evi-
dence from a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 SOC. PROBS. 379 (2000).
63 YANCEY, supra note 55, at 70-71 (describing the study of group-based racial atti-
tudes but not delineating which ethnic groups made up the composite of "Latinos" in the
study respondents); see also Roger Lindo, Miembros de las Diversas Razas Prefieren a los
Suyos: Asi lo Afirma una Investigaci6n de la Universidad de California de Los Angeles, LA
OPINION, Nov. 20, 1992, at IC (describing UCLA study indicating Latino social distance
from African Americans); Cynthia Orosco, Aprender a Convivir: Negros e Hispanos, LA
OPINION, Apr. 14, 2001, at 9A (describing a study by Hispanic Link regarding Latino rela-
tions with African Americans in North Carolina, South Carolina, Arkansas, Alabama, and
Tennessee).
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common with African Americans. 64 In contrast, African Americans re-
sponded that they felt they had more in common with Latinos and least in
common with Whites and Asian Americans. It is somewhat ironic that
African Americans, who are publicly depicted as being averse to coalition
building with Latinos, provide survey responses that are actually more in
accord with all the socioeconomic data that demonstrates the commonal-
ity of African American and Latino communities. 65 Meanwhile, Latinos
in contradistinction provide survey responses that fly in the face of all the
socioeconomic data demonstrating African American and Latino parallels. 66
Although some commentators might equate the Latino preference for
White-Anglos over African Americans with the competition they perceive
from African Americans in the labor market, a 1996 sociological study of
racial group competition indicates otherwise. 67 In the study of 477 Lati-
nos from the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey, Bobo and Hutchings
found that prejudice contributes to perceptions of group threat and eco-
nomic competition. They also found that the greater the social distance
Latinos prefer to maintain from African Americans, the more likely they
are to see African Americans as competitors. 61 In other words, the anti-
Black animosity facilitates the perception of African Americans as an eco-
nomic threat. Yet despite media reports to the contrary, the Bobo and Hutch-
ings study indicated a lower rate of African American perception of eco-
nomic competition from Latinos, as compared with the rate of Latino per-
ception of economic threat from African Americans. 69 Similarly, Latinos
attribute disorder to predominantly African American neighborhoods much
more readily than do other racial/ethnic groups. A study published in 2004
64 NAT'L CONFERENCE FOR CMTY. AND JUSTICE, TAKING AMERICA'S PULSE: THE FULL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE SURVEY ON INTER-GROuP RELATIONS 10 (1994).
65 See Tanya Kateri Herndndez, "Too Black to be Latino/a: " Blackness and Blacks as
Foreigners in Latino Studies, I LATINO STUD. 152, 154 (2003) ("Current discussions about
the demographic explosion of Latinos/as and their desire to assume greater political clout
has focused upon the presumed obstructionism and discontent of Anglo-Blacks who must
'relinquish' their power to accommodate Latinos/as."); see also Alex Prud'homme, Race
Relations Browns vs. Blacks, TIME, July 29, 1991, at 14-16 (identifying the source of
Black-Latino hostilities as African Americans' beliefs that "Latinos are benefiting from
civil rights victories won by blacks with little help from Hispanics," "fear that Hispanic
immigrants, who are often willing to work less than the legal minimum wage, are supplant-
ing them in even the lowliest positions," and resistance to "any attempts to increase Latino
employment" and being "unwilling to treat [Latinos] as equals in the fight for equal rights"). A
recent book about Black-Latino hostilities has been criticized for being one-sided in its
blame of African Americans: "The villains invariably turn out to be African-Americans, who
are threatened by demographic changes and shut Latinos out of political office, while re-
fusing to acknowledge that anyone's suffering could ever be as great as theirs." Ed Morales,
Brown Like Me?, NATION, Mar. 8, 2004, at 24.
66 BILL PIATT, BLACK AND BROWN IN AMERICA: THE CASE FOR COOPERATION 52-57
(1997) (detailing the socioeconomic factors that align Latino and African American interests).
67 Lawrence Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings, Perceptions of Racial Group Competition:
Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context, 61 AM. Soc.
REV. 951 (1996).681 d. at 963.
69 Id. at 964.
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demonstrated that neighborhood racial context in Chicago shapes percep-
tions of disorder more powerfully than actual observations of disorder.7"
The Latino affinity for White-Anglos over African Americans is part
and parcel of the Latino identification with whiteness. Indeed, in contrast
to the many reports of a Latino preference for mixed-race census racial cate-
gories, there is a strong Latino preference for the White racial category and
some Latino groups like Cubans disproportionately select the White ra-
cial category.7 Moreover, the Latino National Political Survey, a study of
Latino racial preferences across generations in the United States from 1989
to 1990, found that a substantial majority of Latino respondents chose to
self-identify as White.72 It is important to note that the Latino National
Political Survey study was able to examine the preference for whiteness
divorced from any ancillary effects that variation in census racial category
structures can include.73 The study indicated that the White racial cate-
gory is particularly preferred by recent immigrants of all skin color shades.74
And when later generations do move away from the White racial category,
they do so in favor of collective national ethnic labels like "Latino" or "His-
panic." 75 Furthermore, the Latino imagination consistently identifies a White
face as the quintessential Latino.76 Even for those Latinos who do acknowl-
edge their African ancestry, there is a cultural pressure to emphasize their
Latino ethnicity publicly as a mechanism for distancing themselves from
70 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma
and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows," 67 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 319, 332-33, 336
(2004) (summarizing findings of study of five hundred block groups in Chicago).
71 William Darity, Jr., Darrick Hamilton & Jason Dietrich, Passing on Blackness: Lati-
nos, Race and Earnings in the USA, 9 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 847 (2002).
72 William Darity, Jr. & Tanya Golash Boza, Choosing Race: Evidence from the Latino
National Political Survey 4-5 (2004), available at http://paa2004.princeton.edu/download.
asp?submissionid=41644 (discussing findings from study of Mexican American, Cuban, and
Puerto Rican respondents in the United States); see also William A. Darity, Jr. et al.,
Bleach in the Rainbow: Latino Ethnicity and Preference for Whiteness, 13 TRANSFORMING
ANTHROPOLOGY 103 (2005).
73 A Hispanic-origin ethnicity category was not added to the list of racial categories on
the census until 1980. See Transfer of Responsibility for Certain Statistical Standards from
OMB to Dep't of Commerce, Directives for the Conduct of Federal Statistical Activities,
Directive 15, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,260, 19,269 (May 4, 1978). This permitted Latinos to self-
identify both as of Hispanic origin and as belonging to a racial category (Black, White,
Asian, Indian, or Other). With the 1980 census Latino respondents could self-select their
racial and ethnic designation rather than have one designated by a census enumerator. Prior
to the 1980 census, enumerators were instructed to observe and then classify Hispanics
who "were definitely not Negro" as White. See Sharon M. Lee, Racial Classifications in
the U.S. Census: 1890-1990, 16 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 75, 78 (1993). Mexicans were
exempted from this White versus Negro visual inspection when "Mexican" was briefly
included as its own racial category on the 1930 census. Id. From 1940 to 1970, Mexicans
were officially included in the White category. Id.; see also CLARA E. RODRIGUEZ, CHANG-
ING RACE: LATINOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY OF ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES
(2000).
14 Darity & Boza, supra note 72, at 13.
75 Id.
76 Denise DiFulco, Can You Tell a Mexican fronz a Puerto Rican?, LATINA, Aug. 2003,
at 86, 86.
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public association with the denigrated societal class of African Ameri-
cans. 77 This truism is highlighted by the popular refrain "the darker the
skin, the louder the Spanish. 78
While commentators in the United States are seemingly oblivious to
the pre-existing anti-Black racism of Latinos, journalists from abroad have
observed a number of disturbing examples. For instance, a 2001 British
Broadcasting Company news item entitled "Hate in Action" noted that
Latino gangs in Los Angeles have a clear mission of anti-Black ethnic
cleansing in their neighborhoods and that Latinos are increasingly perpe-
trators of anti-Black hate crimes in the United States. 79 In fact, four La-
tino gang members were recently convicted in Los Angeles for engaging in a
six-year conspiracy to assault and murder African Americans in the city's
Highland Park neighborhood.80 During the trial, federal prosecutors dem-
onstrated that African American residents were terrorized in an effort to
force them out of a neighborhood perceived as Latino.8 Notably, the vic-
tims of the violence were not themselves members of gangs. One African
American resident was murdered as he looked for a parking space.82 As a
consequence of the incendiary facts, the trial garnered some media atten-
tion and is thus an exception to the general public silence about Latino ex-
pressions of anti-Black bias in the United States.83
The one area in which Latino anti-Black racism has begun to be dis-
cussed in the United States is with respect to the apparent racial caste
system of Spanish-language television that presents Latinos as almost
exclusively White.84 In fact, because of the scarce but derogatory images
of Afro-Latinos in the media, activists have been lobbying the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund to consider a lawsuit against the
two major Spanish-language networks to challenge their depiction of Afro-
" PATRICIA R. PESSAR, A VISA FOR A DREAM: DOMINICANS IN THE UNITED STATES 44
(1995).
18 DAVID HOWARD, COLORING THE NATION: RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC 114-15 (2001).
79 Pilar Marrero, El Odio en Acci6n, BBCMUNDO.COM, Aug. 29, 2001, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/newsid_ 1513000/1513820.stm.
80 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Gang Members Convicted of Federal Hate Crimes
for Murders and Assaults of African-Americans (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06 crt_481 .html.
8' See John Spano, Blacks Were Targeted, Witness Insists: A Highland Park Gang Member
Testifies in a Civil Rights Conspiracy Trial That a 1999 Murder Was Part of a Racial
Cleansing Campaign, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at B4.
82 See Andrew Murr, A Gang War with a Twist: Gangbangers in L.A. on Trial for Deadly
Hate Crimes, NEWSWEEK, July 17, 2006, at 29.
83 See Tanya K. Hernndez, Op-Ed., Roots of Latino/Black Anger: Longtime Prejudices,
Not Economic Rivalry, Fuel Tensions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at M I (discussing the growing
pattern of Latino gangs targeting peaceful, non-gang-affiliated Black residents in Los An-
geles, culminating in the murder of fourteen-year-old Cheryl Green on December 15, 2006).
81 Michael A. Fletcher, The Blond, Blue-Eyed Face of Spanish TV, WASH. POST, Aug.
3, 2000, at AO1.
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 275 2007
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
Latinos.t5 Some Latino activists see a direct parallel between the whiteness
of Spanish-language television and Latino politics. One such activist states:
Latino leaders and organizations do not want to acknowledge that
racism exists among our people, so they have ignored the issue
by subscribing to a national origin strategy. This strategy identifies
Latinos as a group comprising different nationalities, thereby cre-
ating the false impression that Latinos live in a color-blind soci-
ety. 86
Many concrete examples demonstrate that Latinos are not colorblind.
To begin with, Afro-Latinos in the United States experience color discrimi-
nation at the hands of other Latinos. In fact, the 2002 National Survey of
Latinos indicated that Latinos with more pronounced African ancestry,
such as Dominicans, more readily cite color discrimination as an expla-
nation for the bias they experience from other Latinos. 87 Furthermore, de-
spite variations across regions and ethnic groups, the commonality of social
distance in relations with African Americans remains constant. What fol-
lows is a preliminary review of the social science literature that demon-
strates the consistency of anti-Black sentiment in Latino communities across
the United States.
C. Racial Attitudes Among Latinos Across Ethnic Groups and Regions
Of all the Latino ethnic subgroups, Mexican Americans have the largest
demographic presence within the United States.8 8 The development of Mexi-
can American racial identity in the United States has been subject to a vari-
ety of influences. Prior to the Chicano movement, Mexican American leaders
claimed that Mexicans were Caucasian and therefore deserving of the same
social status as White-Anglos. 9 "The Mexican American generation saw
85 Carlos Flores, Race Discrimination Within the Latino Community, DIALOGO, Win-
ter/Spring 2001, at 30-31, available at http://condor.depaul.edu/-dialogolback-issues/issue-
5/racediscrimination.htm.
86 Id.
8 
PEW HISPANIC CTR. & THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS
74 (2002), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/15.pdf.
8 The 2000 census reported that of the 35.3 million Latinos in the United States, 58%
were of Mexican or Mexican American origin. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau,
Census 2000 Paints Statistical Portrait of the Nation's Hispanic Population (May 10, 2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/cb0l-8l.html. This large demo-
graphic presence represents not only contemporary immigration flows from Mexico, but
also the generations of Mexican Americans who trace their roots to the incorporation of
Mexican lands into the United States after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which
ended the Mexican American War. See RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF
GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A LEGACY OF CONFLICT (1990); THE MEXICAN WAR: A CRISIS FOR
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Archie P. McDonald ed., 1969).
89 Ruben Salazar, the Los Angeles Times journalist who most faithfully reported the
developments of the Chicano movement, observed that "many [Mexican Americans] still
(Vol. 42
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themselves as a White group," writes Professor Ian Haney Lopez. "This self-
conception both drew upon and led to prejudice against African Americans,
which in turn hindered direct relations between those two groups."9 Only
after widespread police brutality and judicial mistreatment of Mexicans
in the wake of the Black civil rights movement did a Chicano movement
that stressed a non-White Chicano identity emerge. 9' Yet this non-White
identity focused upon Chicanos' indigenous ancestry and completely sub-
merged their African ancestry.92
Even with their construction of a non-White racial identification, Chi-
canos in California and the Southwest in the 1960s and 1970s expressed
feelings of cultural superiority with respect to African Americans that ad-
versely affected intergroup interactions. 93 At the time, one Chicano college
student summed up this sentiment when he wrote:
We're not like the Negroes. They want to be white men because
they have no history to be proud of. My ancestors come from one
of the most civilized nations in the world.94
Such sentiments in turn fed Chicano resentment about the allocation of
government funds in Los Angeles after the 1965 Watts urban uprising, and
the allocation of government funds to service agencies catering to what
were described to be as "less needy" African Americans. 95 Such perspec-
tives have not greatly changed in the new millennium. In Los Angeles,
where a predominant number of Latinos are Chicano, it has been observed:
Many Latinos fail to understand the complexity and severity of
the black experience. They frequently bash blacks for their pov-
erty and goad them to pull themselves up like other immigrants
cling to the idea that Mexican Americans are Caucasians, thus white, thus 'one of the boys."'
Ruben Salazar, Chicanos Would Find Identity Before Coalition With Blacks, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1979, reprinted in BORDER CORRESPONDENT: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1955-1970, at
239, 241 (Mario T. Garcia ed., 1995). In addition, Salazar observed that "several of the
more conservative Mexican-American leaders strongly oppose any 'mixing' of Mexican-
American and Negro grievances." Ruben Salazar, Negro Drive Worries Mexican-Americans,
L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1963, reprinted in BORDER CORRESPONDENT: SELECTED WRITINGS,
1955-1970, at 113, 113 (Mario T. Garcia ed., 1995).
90 Ian Haney Lopez, Protest, Repression, and Race: Legal Violence and the Chicano
Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 216 (2001).
91 Id.
92 Tanya Katerf Herndndez, Afro-Mexicans and the Chicano Movement: The Unknown
Story, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1537 (2004) (reviewing IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL:
THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003)).
93 FRED BARBARO, Ethnic Resentment, in BLACK/BROWN/WHITE RELATIONS: RACE RELA-
TIONS IN THE 1970s 77, 89-91 (Charles V. Willie ed., 1977).
94 1d. at 91.
91 Id. at 90.
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have done. Worse, some even repeat the same vicious anti-black
epithets used by racist whites.
96
For instance, in the 2000 New York Times series entitled "How Race is
Lived in America," an investigation into the North Carolina pork industry
revealed a rigidly planned hierarchy in job tasks assigned by race that
usually had White-Anglos employed as supervisors over both African
Americans and Latinos.97 Yet rather than focusing on the injustice of all-
White management ranks, Mexican worker Mrs. Fernandez is quoted as
saying, "Blacks don't want to work. They're lazy."98 Her husband is quoted
as saying, "I hate the Blacks."9 9 Even Mexican Americans with greater expo-
sure to the U.S. history of racism express cultural superiority over Afri-
can Americans. One prominent Mexican American business executive and
commentator in Los Angeles, Fernando Oaxaca, accounts for the differ-
ence in Latino and African American economic conditions with the ex-
planation, "[W]e have a work ethic."' °
Even younger generations are not immune to anti-Black sentiment. In
recent years the Los Angeles town of Inglewood has experienced vio-
lence almost every time Black History Month is celebrated. 0' The source
of the violence is Latino teens' resentment at the month-long celebration
of Black culture. In February 1999, the principal of Inglewood High School
cancelled the Black History Month celebration in order to avoid the vio-
lence. 02
Los Angeles Latinos have even proposed having block association
meetings that exclude the African American residents of the block, prompt-
ing one African American resident to state, "[I]t seems like the Latinos
don't even want to try to forge neighborhood unity." 103 This social distance
is paralleled even in church congregations in which Latino and African
American parishioners who share the same church attend separate ser-
vices, serve on separate parish councils, and never meet.' °4 It is interest-
ing to note that even when African American congregations in other areas
of the United States have actively made it part of their ministry to reach
out to their Latino neighbors, the social distance of Latinos remains.0 5 Eth-
96 Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Urban Tension: Latinos' New Clout Threatening to Blacks,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 26, 2003, at V3.
97 Charlie LeDuff, At a Slaughterhouse, Some Things Never Die: Who Kills, Who Cuts,
Who Bosses Can Depend on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at Al.
98 Id.
99 Id.
'0 Gary Lee & Robert Suro, Latino-Black Rivalry Grows: Los Angeles Reflects Ten-
sions Between Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at AO1.
101 Martin Kasindorf & Maria Puente, Hispanics and Blacks Find Their Futures Entan-
gled, USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 1999, at 21A.
10 2 Id.
103 Lee & Suro, supra note 100, at A01.
104 Id.
105 Francis W. Guidry, Reaching The People Across the Street: An African American
Church Reaches Out To Its Hispanic Neighbors (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
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nographic studies of Mexican Americans in Chicago and the southern states
uncover the same disdain for African Americans and attributions of black-
ness in Latino subgroups.0 6 For example, one Latino student at a Chicago
high school said: "It's crazy. But a lot of the Hispanic kids here just don't
want to be friends with the blacks."'0
7
The general racial relations of Cubans with African Americans in Flor-
ida are not much better. In fact, Miami, Florida (a city in which Cubans
and other Latinos predominate and hold political power), has the distinc-
tion of being the only city that was the locus of four separate race riots in
the 1980s.' The immediate causes of all four riots were police shootings
of African Americans.'0 9 Although police brutality against African Ameri-
cans is endemic throughout the United States, Miami is a city with many
Latino police officers and, more alarmingly, a Latino population seemingly
indifferent to anti-Black police brutality. For instance, when a Colombian
immigrant police officer was found guilty of manslaughter for killing an
African American motorcyclist, the Latino community came out in pro-
test."0 Furthermore, Latinos publicly denounced the urban uprisings that
marked each affront to the humanity of African Americans as the work of
the "criminal element." "' Indeed, sociologists in Miami have noted that
the Latino discourse about African Americans evinces the association of Af-
rican Americans with crime and "an invidious comparison between His-
panic economic advancement-attributed to hard work, family values, and
self-reliance-and black dependency on welfare and other social pro-
grams."1 2
In contrast, studies of Puerto Rican relations with African Americans
in the northeastern United States have traditionally noted the smaller de-
gree of social distance that exists between the groups."3 However, even
Drew University Theological School) (on file with author).
106See NICHOLAS DE GENOVA & ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, LATINO CROSSINGS: MEXI-
CANS, PUERTO RICANS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 187-89 (2003) (dis-
cussing ethnographic study of Latino racial attitudes in Chicago); McClain et al., supra
note 47 (discussing study of Latino immigrant views of Blacks in the U.S. South); see also
Rachel L. Swarns, Bridging a Racial Rift That Isn't Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2006, at Al (describing derogatory racial attitudes of Mexican workers in the U.S. South
toward African Americans).
107 Jacquelyn Heard, Racial Strife Runs Deep at High School: Black and Hispanic
Staff, Students Clash at Farragut, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1992, at 1C.
108 Marvin Dunn & Alex Stepick III, Blacks in Miami, in MIAMI Now! IMMIGRATION,
ETHNICITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 41 (Guillermo J. Grenier & Alex Stepick III eds., 1992).
19 Id.
I0 Id. at 45.
11 John F. Stack & Christopher L. Warren, The Reform Tradition and Ethnic Politics:
Metropolitan Miami Confronts the 1990s, in MIAMI Now! IMMIGRATION, ETHNiCITY, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 174 (Guillermo J. Grenier & Alex Stepick III eds., 1992).
112 Guillermo J. Grenier & Max Castro, Blacks and Cubans in Miami: The Negative
Consequences of the Cuban Enclave on Ethnic Relations, in GOVERNING AMERICAN CIT-
IES: INTERETHNIC COALITIONS, COMPETITION, AND CONFLICT, 137, 151 (Michael Jones-
Correa ed., 2001).
3 See Nelson Peery, Witnessing History: An Octogenarian Reflects on Fifty Years of
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the Puerto Rican subgroup expresses anti-Black racism. Angela Jorge
noted early on that Latinos such as Puerto Ricans are taught within their
family circles to dislike African Americans." 4 One observer of the civil
rights coalitions of Puerto Ricans and African Americans even stated that
the coalition "was more of a strategic device than a factual description of
the true nature of the relationship between the groups. Puerto Rican par-
ticipation in civil rights organizations and on picket lines was lower than
for whites."'" 5 Another commentator noted that Puerto Ricans, because of
the anti-Black prejudice they harbored, were not eager to be identified with
African Americans." 6 In fact, the residential segregation between the two
groups is high." 7 Even though Puerto Rican youth organizations in the
1960s and 1970s modeled themselves after the Black Panthers, the groups
never had much contact with Black Power organizations."'
In fact, although relations between Puerto Ricans and African Ameri-
cans in New York City are typically depicted as unusually harmonious,
electoral politics studies have shown the two groups at odds with one an-
other." 9 Similarly, in Chicago, racial tensions between Puerto Ricans and
African Americans have arisen over the competition for housing rehabili-
tation, in which Puerto Ricans have depicted African Americans as pre-
sumed gang members, criminals, and generally the cause of the tightening
housing market. 20
The concern with a racialized competition between Latinos and Af-
rican Americans does not dissipate when one examines Dominicans, who
are frequently viewed as Black themselves.' 2' Despite often sharing the more
visible facial imprint of African ancestry, Dominicans and African Ameri-
cans have a high level of residential segregation, 22 and Dominicans resent
African American-Latino Relations, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at
305, 306-08.
"14 Angela Jorge, The Black Puerto Rican Woman in Contemporary American Society,
in THE PUERTO RICAN WOMAN 134, 139 (Edna Acosta-Beln ed., 1979).
"I BARBARO, supra note 93, at 83.
116 Jos6 E. Cruz, Interminority Relations in Urban Settings: Lessons from the Black-
Puerto Rican Experience, in BLACK AND MULTIRACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 84, 90 (Yvette
M. Alex-Assensoh & Lawrence J. Hanks eds., 2000).
"
7 Id. at 91.
"I Id. at 92; see also MIGUEL "MICKEY" MELENDEZ, WE TOOK THE STREETS: FIGHT-
ING FOR LATINO RIGHTS WITH THE YOUNG LORDS (2003).
"9 Angelo Falc6n, Black and Latino Politics in New York City: Race and Ethnicity in a
Changing Urban Context, in LATINOS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 171 (F. Chris Garcia
ed., 1988); Silvio Torres-Saillant, Racism in the Americas and the Latino Scholar, in NEI-
THER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 281, 299.
120 See ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, NATIONAL PERFORMANCES: THE POLITICS OF CLASS,
RACE, AND SPACE IN PUERTO RICAN CHICAGO 228-30 (2003).
121 Jose Itzigsohn et al., Immigrant Incorporation and Racial Identity: Racial Self-
Identification Among Dominican Immigrants, 28 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 50, 69 (2005)
(describing high levels of Black external racialization of Dominicans in New York and
their high level of Black self-identification).
122 Lance Freeman, A Note on the Influence of African Heritage on Segregation: The
Case of Dominicans, 35 URB. AFF. 137, 141 (1999).
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job competition from African Americans.123 Recent reports of high-school
violence show Dominican youth and African American youth involved in
violent clashes as well. 124 Yet despite the troublesome incidents demon-
strafing discord between Latinos and African Americans and the complexity
of Latino racial attitudes, the emerging Latino inter-ethnic employment
discrimination cases often treat Latinos as incapable of racial or ethnic dis-
crimination.
II. THE EMERGING LATINO INTER-ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION CASES
The majority of the emerging cases of Latino inter-ethnic discrimi-
nation are disparate treatment claims filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.125 This accords with the majority of employment dis-
123 Jose Itzigsohn & Carlos Dore-Cabral, Competing Identities? Race, Ethnicity and
Panethnicity Among Dominicans in the United States, 15 Soc. F. 225, 240 (2000).
124 See Russell, supra note 15 (reporting the harassment of African American athletes
by a Dominican gang of students known as the "D Block" in Perth Amboy, N.J.).
125 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). A list of the relevant cases presently available in Lexis
Nexis and Westlaw follows. Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., 336 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2003)
(African American plaintiff alleging that Hispanic supervisor treated Hispanic employees
better and gave her more onerous responsibilities); Osei-Buckle v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,
No. CV-96-00753-DDP, 1998 WL 552126, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 1998) (African Ameri-
can plaintiff alleging Hispanic supervisor discriminated against her and expressed prefer-
ence for Hispanic employees in allocating work assignments); Patino v. Rucker, No. 96-753 1,
1997 WL 416949, at *1 (2d Cir. July 25, 1997) (Puerto Rican porter for Columbia Univer-
sity alleging that he was discharged by his Hispanic supervisor and replaced with another
Latino porter, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Arrocha v. City Univ. of
N.Y., No. CV021868, 2004 WL 594981, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (Afro-Panamanian
college instructor alleging illegal termination in preference for non-Black Hispanic employ-
ees); Isaac v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, No. 00-0890-CIV, 2002 WL 31086118,
at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2002) (African American plaintiff alleging discrimination by His-
panic supervisor); Allen v. Bake-Line Prods., Inc., No. 98 C 1119, 2001 WL 1249054, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2001) (analyzing allegation by fifteen African American plaintiffs that
Hispanic management preferred Hispanic employees and failed to promote African Ameri-
can employees to position of supervisor as an individual disparate treatment case because
the statistical data presented by plaintiff was insufficient to mount a systemic case); Rai v.
Dynagear, Inc., No.98 C 6053, 2000 WL 875401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2000) (Southeast
Asian Indian plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination by Hispanic supervisor and other
Hispanic managers who preferred to work with Mexicans and not Indians); Olumuyiwa v.
Harvard Prot. Corp., No. 98-CV-5110, 1999 WL 529553, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1999)
(Nigerian plaintiff alleging that Hispanic and Yugoslavian employees were hired at a higher
wage and received greater number of work hours than Black employees); Rodriguez v.
Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D.N.J. 1999) (Hispanic plaintiff alleging that Hispanic supervi-
sor denied him a promotion and subjected him to a hostile work environment because of his
involvement in Hispanic community activism); Russell v. Am. Eagle Airlines, 46 F. Supp.
2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (African American aircraft mechanic alleging that employees and
supervisors who were either White or Hispanic racially harassed him); Thompson v. Chi-
cago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, No. 97 C 1172, 1999 WL 258488, at *1 (N.D. II. Apr.
13, 1999) (African American plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination and replacement
by Hispanic candidate along with preferential treatment for Hispanic employees); Harper v.
Hunter Coll., No. 95 CIV. 10388, 1999 WL 147698, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1999) (West
Indian assistant principal custodial supervisor alleging that his Hispanic immediate super-
visor and Black American director of housekeeping subjected him to harassment, retalia-
tion, and termination); Sprott v. Franco, No. 94 Civ. 3818, 1998 WL 472061, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
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crimination claims that are filed by individual plaintiffs asserting dispa-
rate treatment rather than class claims of systemic disparate treatment or
disparate impact. 26 Accordingly, this Article's examination of Latino in-
ter-ethnic employment discrimination focuses on individual disparate treat-
ment claims.
Aug. 7, 1998) (African American who worked as Deputy Director of New York City Hous-
ing Authority Office of Equal Opportunity alleged that her Hispanic supervisor harassed her
and denied her salary increases because of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Vin-
cent v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc. of Fla., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1405 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (Black,
Haitian-born security guard alleged that Black and Haitian guards were assigned undesir-
able posts while Whites and Hispanics were given desirable posts with rest rooms); Webb
v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (African American title clerk alleg-
ing discrimination in a predominantly Caucasian-Hispanic car dealership); Bernard v. N.Y.
City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 93 CIV.8593, 1996 WL 457284 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1996)
(pro se application by a self-described dark-skinned Black woman born in Trinidad, West
Indies alleging that she had been terminated from her position as Administrative Assistant
because of her race, color, and national origin, all in violation of Title VII, because of negative
interactions with her Puerto Rican manager and other Latina co-workers); Mathura v.
Council for Human Servs. Home Care Servs., Inc., No. 95CIV.4191, 1996 WL 157496
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996) (Black Belizean plaintiff alleging that Hispanic supervisor har-
assed and verbally abused him and treated him differently from the Hispanic employees);
Roberts v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., No. BC 227280, 2003 WL 1194102, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 17, 2003) (African American camera technician alleging Hispanic supervisor rele-
gated him to temporary job positions and routinely passed him over in favor of non-African
Americans with less seniority, experience or expertise who were often preselected when open-
ings were not posted).
The number of emerging cases has thus far been modest, in large measure because of
the racially segmented nature of the employment market, which relegates different racial
and ethnic groups to different employment sectors and job positions. See HERBERT HILL,
BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK, AND THE LAW 182-83,
254 (Univ. Wis. Press 1985) (1977) (providing statistical data regarding the racial segmen-
tation of the labor market); DEIRDRE A. ROYSTER, RACE AND THE INVISIBLE HAND: How
WHITE NETWORKS EXCLUDE BLACK MEN FROM BLUE-COLLAR JOBS 29-33 (2003) (ex-
plaining the dynamic of labor market racial segmentation and how the operation of ethnic
networks facilitates racial hierarchy); Elizabeth Higginbotham, Employment for Profes-
sional Black Women in the Twentieth Century, in INGREDIENTS FOR WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT
POLICY 73-91 (Christine Bose & Glenna Spitze eds., 1987) (detailing how even when
Blacks enter into traditionally segregated professions, they are relegated to racially segre-
gated positions). It is the longstanding existence of racial segmentation that in turn can fuel
racial hostilities when different racial and ethnic groups interact in the workplace. See,
e.g., Roberto Lovato, The Latinization of New Orleans, NEW Am. MEDIA, Oct. 18, 2005,
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view-article.html?article-id=fa92e2c88a639854 1
8da75582292b5c7 (describing the influx of Latino workers as a "radical Latinization that is
transforming [New Orleans and] other urban landscapes in the country" and that has "strained
race relations by lowering wages and fostering competition between groups").
'
26 See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 83 (2001)
(describing the different stages of proof in a class-based systemic disparate treatment case
alleging that an employer's hiring or promotion practice results in the hiring or promotion
of fewer members of a protected group in relation to the number of qualified group mem-
bers in the local labor pool); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:
VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 70-87 (2001) (describing the doctrinal
features of an adverse impact case in which a business policy or practice affects a plain-
tiff's protected group as a class differently than it affects members of other groups); John
J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination,
43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019-21 (1991) (detailing the numerical patterns in kinds of cases
filed).
[Vol. 42
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A. Doctrinal Contours of Disparate Treatment
In an individual disparate treatment case, an employer may not, with
a rule, policy, or decision, treat an employee differently than she treats other
employees on account of race or ethnicity.'2 7 The plaintiff must prove that
the employer purposefully treated her differently compared to similarly
situated individuals from other racial or ethnic groups. Yet absent direct
evidence of discriminatory motive'28 (for example, outright statements of
animus closely timed with an adverse employment decision), a plaintiff can
rely upon circumstantial evidence. This is done with an elaborate burden-
shifting process. 29
'
27 See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 126, at 30-54 (describing the features of an individ-
ual disparate treatment case, which can also be based upon color, national origin, gender,
or religion).
128 In a situation where the employer is alleged to have both discriminatory and nondis-
criminatory motives for the employment decision, known as a mixed-motive case, a plain-
tiff who can establish that discrimination played a "motivating factor" in the employer's
decision is entitled to judgment. Thereafter the defendant is allowed to prove that she
would have made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive, and if the defendant
is successful the plaintiff is not entitled to any compensatory relief on her claim; she can
still collect attorney's fees for prevailing on the merits, and can possibly obtain injunctive
relief. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
129 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). A plaintiff can
establish a prima facie inference of discrimination by showing that she is a member of a
protected group (race, sex, etc.) and was rejected after applying for a job or promotion for
which he or she was qualified, and that after rejecting the plaintiff the employer continued
to seek applications from persons of plaintiff's qualifications. The employer can rebut the
prima facie showing of discrimination by proffering a nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. Thereafter the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present either
further evidence of discriminatory intent or evidence that the defendant's proffered nondis-
criminatory justification was actually a pretext for discrimination. The elements of the prima
facie case may be modified to suit varying factual patterns beyond the hiring and promo-
tion context. But it is not sufficient for a plaintiff merely to show that the employer's prof-
fer of a nondiscriminatory reason was "unbelievable." See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,
530 U.S. 133 (2000); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Schol-
ars have observed that over time, courts have transformed the burden-shifting process into
one that is more burdensome on plaintiffs than originally intended by McDonnell Douglas.
See, e.g., Symposium, Employment Discrimination and the Problems of Proof, 61 LA. L.
REv. 487 (2001). It is also unclear whether the Supreme Court decision in Desert Palace
has altered the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard. See MARION G. CRAIN ET AL.,
WORKLAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 560 (2005) ("Although, on its face, the Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Desert Palace was uncontroversial, it has sparked a lively debate in
the lower courts (so far principally confined to district courts) regarding whether the case
has altered the McDonnell Douglas proof structure."); see also id. at 560 ("Traditionally,
the mixed-motives structure was seen as an alternative proof structure .... But now that
the Supreme Court has held that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove a mixed-
motive case, there is a question whether the two structures have effectively been merged,
given that circumstantial evidence is the means to prove pretext."); Sheila A. Skojec, Effect
of Mixed or Dual Motives in Actions Under Title VII, 83 A.L.R. FED. 268 (listing cases that
apply Desert Palace differently). But see Ash v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (per
curiam) (chastising the Eleventh Circuit for its inappropriate test once pretext is shown and
thereby suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test remains separate from the
Price Waterhouse mixed-motive test).
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In the absence of evidence of overt discriminatory treatment, the plain-
tiff may offer statistical data about the composition of the workforce in
comparison to the number of racial minorities in the relevant labor mar-
ket to allow the court to infer discrimination. 30 Ironically, this ability to
infer discrimination from racial disparity in the workplace can lead fact-
finders in inter-ethnic discrimination cases to conclude that diverse work-
places are free of discrimination. The juridical belief in the inherent salu-
tary powers of a diverse workplace exists despite established Supreme Court
precedent to the contrary. In fact, the Supreme Court has rejected the no-
tion that a workplace with a large number of employees from a plaintiff's
protected group is de facto free of bias against the plaintiff. 3' However,
the emerging inter-ethnic discrimination cases suggest that judges are doc-
trinal amnesiacs when caught up in the romanticization of diversity.
B. The Diversity Defense and Its Obfuscation
The diversity defense describes the way in which legal actors imme-
diately view a racially "diverse" workplace as the equivalent of a racially
harmonious workplace.'32 These legal actors view people of color as the
same, overlooking the particular histories and present incidence of racial
animus within and across different ethnic groups.'33 The judicial fashion-
130 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 (noting that statistical evidence show-
ing an employer's general policy or practice is relevant to whether an individual employ-
ment decision was discriminatory).
131 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (vacating
summary judgment in a sex discrimination case in which the district court erroneously
concluded that an over-representation of women in the workplace obviated the existence of
bias against women by an employer that refused to accept job applications from women
with preschool-age children).
132 It should be noted that more than a decade ago Juan Perea presciently suggested
that employers would be able to defend themselves against a claim of national-origin dis-
crimination by the presentation of workplace statistics indicating a large percentage of racial
minorities. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 864-65 (1994) (describing
the potential for an employer's "minority percentage points defense" to national origin
discrimination claims). Yet the two cases available to Perea at that time did not explicitly
deploy racial minority percentages data as the justification for denying relief to the plain-
tiffs, as is done in the Latino inter-ethnic discrimination cases discussed herein. See Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93 (1973) (finding no evidence of national-origin discrimi-
nation when there was no disparity in Latino hiring and the only direct evidence was em-
ployer's neutrally applied policy against hiring undocumented workers); Garcia v. Gloor,
618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that in the absence of both direct evidence
of national origin discrimination and an indirect suggestion of discrimination from a work-
place statistical imbalance in the hiring of Latinos, the neutral application of a workplace
English-only rule was not national-origin discrimination).
133 The colorblind approach of the diversity defense is not exclusive to judges of any
particular race. Cf. Martin Kilson, Anatomy of Black Conservatism, 59 TRANSITION 4, 7 (1993)
(describing the articulation of colorblind discourse amongst Black intellectuals). The one
exception to the judicial use of the diversity defense that appears in the emerging inter-
ethnic discrimination cases is in the context of White plaintiffs filing reverse-discrimination
allegations in diverse non-White workplace settings. This is the only context where the
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ing of a diversity defense to claims of employment discrimination appears to
reflect the public romanticization of diversity as a panacea for racial con-
flict. " ' Diversity as a concept was first introduced into the legal discourse
as a justification for race-conscious remedies to racial inequality, such as
affirmative action.'35 Since that time, it has taken on a force of its own in
the public imagination'36 through the operation of what sociologist Lauren
Edelman aptly terms "diversity rhetoric."'37 Research corroborates the public
support for diversity and indicates that diverse workplaces help to facilitate
creative problem solving, attract larger client bases, and effectively oper-
ate within a global marketplace. 3t
diverse workplace does not mislead judges into automatically presuming the existence of a
bias-free workplace. See Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(reversing summary judgment order for defendant where White plaintiff alleged discrimi-
nation in layoff decision from racially diverse workplace); EEOC v. David Gomez & As-
socs., Inc., 1997 WL 136285 (N.D. I11. Mar. 17, 1997) (denying summary judgment where
White plaintiff alleged discrimination because he was not referred for employment by
agency that chose to refer Latino and African American candidates instead).
134 See Tanya Kateri Hernndez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an
Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 102 (1998) (observing the growing
societal belief that racial diversity will deconstruct and transcend race and racism); see
also Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
53, 106 (1999) (discussing the growing scholarship that equates increasing racial diversity
with the reconstruction of racism and the Black-White paradigm of race).
"'
35 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding the use of racial
preferences to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented students of color legally permissi-
ble to serve the compelling interests of achieving a diverse and robust exchange of ideas
and developing leaders from various racial communities).
136 See Lana Bortolot, Group Dynamics: Companies Embrace Diversity, Teach Em-
ployees Respect, AM NEW YORK, Mar. 6, 2006, at 33, available at http://www.amNY.com
careers ("Remember when 'synergy' was the buzzword a few years ago? Well, get ready
for a new one. Diversity is what's hot now."); Myron Curry, Diversity: No Longer Just Black
and White, BLACK EOE J., Spring 2005, at 46, 46 ("Most CEO's and executives alike have
come to discover that diversity is what often makes for better business."); Chris Woodyard,
Multilingual Staff Can Drive up Auto Sales; Ethnic Communities Show Buying Power,
USA TODAY, Feb. 22, 2005, at BI (reporting that businesses all over the country are realiz-
ing that being multicultural has profit benefits); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived
Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1937-38 (2001) ("Nor is
diversity merely a widespread ideal among social and educational elites; it is now an ex-
plicit public policy goal emphatically endorsed by both major parties and opposed by none
...."). But see Orlando Patterson, On the Provenance of Diversity, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 51, 61 (2005) ("What is true of the private sector has been true of society and the
economy at large. The focus has shifted from addressing the very special problems of Afri-
can Americans to the promotion of a feel-good, but largely empty, goal of ethnic diversity.").
137 Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law,
106 AM. J. Soc. 1589 (2001) (discussing employers' "diversity rhetoric" and expansion of
the legal concept of diversity to nonlegal dimensions).
"'
38 See DIVERSITY IN WORK TEAMS: RESEARCH PARADIGMS FOR A CHANGING WORK-
PLACE (Susan E. Jackson & Marian N. Ruderman eds., 1995); see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND,
WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003)
(discussing the importance of workplace bonds to enhancing inter-group relations); Steven
A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85 (2000) (summariz-
ing literature demonstrating the business benefits of a diverse workforce); David B. Wil-
kins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for Business": The
Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117
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However, the mere presence of coworkers from various backgrounds
in a single workplace does not magically foster racial harmony. Indeed,
the research regarding diverse work teams indicates that employers need
to cultivate particular conditions in order to generate effective work teams of
diverse backgrounds.'39 Otherwise, racial conflict and poor social relations
can continue to exist even within that diverse setting.140 In fact, many of the
emerging Latino inter-ethnic cases describe what appear to be racially hos-
tile environments, even though the cases are not litigated as racial har-
assment cases. Unfortunately, court opinions reflect a fanciful notion of
diversity that is not supported by scientific research or legal doctrine.
The diversity defense is most explicitly and comprehensively articu-
lated in the 2004 case Arrocha v. CUNY,14 1 which serves as the paradig-
matic example of the analytical problems surfacing in the emerging inter-
ethnic discrimination cases. This Article focuses on Arrocha to present the
doctrinal problems of the diversity defense. In Arrocha, a self-identified
Afro-Panamanian tutor of Spanish sued City University of New York
(CUNY) for failure to renew his appointment as an adjunct instructor,
claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition against race and national-
origin discrimination. The plaintiff alleged that the Latino heads of the
Medgar Evers College Spanish department discriminated against "Black
Hispanics," and that there was "a disturbing culture of favoritism that fa-
vor[ed] the appointments of white Cubans, Spaniards and white Hispan-
ics from South America."'42 Yet the court dismissed his race and national-
origin discrimination claims because the judge did not understand how a
color hierarchy informs the ways in which Latinos subject other Latinos
to racism and national-origin bias. 143 Indeed, the national-origin claim was
HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1556 (2004).
139 See Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of
Diversity Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCl. Q. 229 (2001 )
(concluding that diverse work teams function better with an "integration-and-learning"
approach than with other approaches).
'40 See Shari Caudron, Diversity Ignites Effective Work Teams, BLACK EOE J., Spring
2005, at 40 (stating that resegregation can occur when racial bias is ignored as an issue in
the workplace). Legal scholar Cynthia Estlund also notes that the potential for conflict is
heightened in low-wage settings and contingent employment sectors where employees'
motivation to overcome differences is undermined by their tenuous connection to the work-
place and employer suppression of communication among workers. ESTLUND, supra note
138, at 45, 56.
141 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).
142 Id. at *7.
t41 Ironically, the judge sua sponte converted the claim into a color-discrimination claim
and allowed it to survive the summary judgment motion. This is an unsatisfactory charac-
terization of Latino inter-ethnic discrimination claims because not all Latino plaintiffs who
experience discrimination have dark skin or prominent African features as markers of their
social treatment. For those Latino plaintiffs whose African ancestry is not readily discerni-
ble, it is important to examine a workplace environment for the deployment of racial stereo-
types tied to national origin status that are an aspect of Latino racial discourse. Indeed,
judges typically view Latino color-discrimination claims as viable when a Latino plaintiff
alleges color discrimination at the hands of a White-Anglo employer or supervisor. See Tanya
[Vol. 42
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dismissed on summary judgment because five of the eight adjunct instruc-
tors who were reappointed were natives of other South or Central Ameri-
can countries such as Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, as well as the Dominican
Republic. The judge stated in the opinion, "Diversity in an employer's staff
undercuts an inference of discriminatory intent." '44
This is a completely erroneous assessment of the social science doc-
trine of statistical inference and its evidentiary justification as it has been
incorporated into employment discrimination jurisprudence. 145 Population
statistics have been traditionally considered relevant to Title VII cases in-
volving gross underrepresentations of racial minorities because our racial
history demonstrates that in the absence of any other explanation it is more
likely than not that racial discrimination accounts for the gross underrep-
resentation . 4 6 Yet the initial Supreme Court authorization in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green to use workforce statistics in individual disparate
treatment cases was only an authorization insofar as such statistics "may
be helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to hire respon-
dent in this case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination.' ' 47 There
was no suggestion that workforce statistics could have a conclusive exculpa-
tory use in such cases. Inverting the traditional use of population statistics
Katerf Hernindez, Latinos at Work: When Color Discrimination Means More Than Color,
in HIERARCHIES OF COLOR: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOCIAL AND CUL-
TURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SKIN COLOR (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., forthcoming 2007). Un-
fortunately for the plaintiff in Arrocha, the jury trial on the color-discrimination issue re-
turned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Telephone Interview with James A. Brown, Esq.,
Attorney for Mr. Arrocha (Feb. 28, 2006). Such a result was inevitable once the judge
handicapped the jury's assessment of the issues by entering summary judgment on the
racial and national origin discrimination claims and thus presented the color claim in isola-
tion from its connections to race and national-origin discrimination.
I"Arrocha, 2004 WL 594981, at *7 (emphasis added).
141 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 (1977) (explaining the precise methods
of measuring statistical significance of racial disparities). While statistical significance
suggests that two or more variables are correlated, its absence yields no definite conclu-
sions about the relationship between the variables. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS &
JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH,
STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (1988); RAMONA L. PAETZOLD &
STEVEN L. WILBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1994). In the absence of statis-
tical significance, it is difficult to conclude from a comparison between workforce compo-
sition numbers and those of the relevant labor market that some social construct other than
pure chance accounts for the workforce numbers. But that absence does not foreclose the
possibility that factors other than pure chance actually did influence the workforce compo-
sition numbers, and more importantly that the individual plaintiff might have received
discriminatory treatment. See KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII
ACTIONS, 14-28 (2d ed. supp. 2005) ("Courts have sometimes erroneously stated that a
statistical calculation yielding less than a finding of a statistically significant level of im-
probability is affirmative evidence of the absence of discrimination. This is completely
illogical and an abuse of statistics for several reasons.").
'46 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) ("Statistics
showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because
such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination . (emphasis
added)).
147 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 287 2007
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
by treating a racially diverse workforce as the equivalent of a bias-free
workplace also contravenes an early Supreme Court approach to proving
Title VII employment discrimination when the plaintiff's protected class
is proportionately represented in the workplace. 41
What follows is a detailed account of established employment dis-
crimination doctrine that is completely overlooked in the emerging inter-
ethnic discrimination cases. The doctrinal details are presented to under-
score the extent to which diversity rhetoric subverts the judicial applica-
tion of existing relevant doctrine.
C. The Traditional Role of Workforce Composition Data in Employment
Discrimination Cases
In 1971, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,14 9 the Supreme Court
was presented with a gender discrimination case in which summary judg-
ment had been granted in favor of an employer that did not accept job appli-
cations from women with pre-school-age children despite employing men
with pre-school-age children. The district court had based its award of sum-
mary judgment upon the premise that no question of bias could exist in a
workplace in which 75 to 80% of those hired were women from an appli-
cation pool in which 70 to 75% were women. 50 In vacating the summary
judgment due to a conflict with Title VII's mandate, the Supreme Court,
in a per curiam opinion, unanimously rejected the equation of significant
numbers of women in the workplace with the simplistic conclusion that
no bias against women existed."15 In other words, the Supreme Court was
fully aware that gender discrimination can exist even where a large num-
ber of women are employed in a given workplace. This is because Title VII
creates an individual right not to be unfairly treated because of protected
group status. It is immaterial to a proof of discrimination against that indi-
vidual whether other members of the protected group have been hired. It
is true that an inference of discrimination can be based upon a statistically
significant disproportionate absence of protected group members from a
141 The diversity defense's esteem for the probative value of workforce composition statis-
tics in discrimination cases stands in marked contrast to courts' usual disinclination to rely
upon workforce statistics to decide individual disparate treatment cases. See, e.g., Bogren
v. Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 406 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Second, we conclude the generic type of
employment statistics presented by Bogren are not probative of the reason for her termina-
tion."); Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[S]tatistics are
improper vehicles to prove discrimination in disparate treatment (as opposed to disparate
impact) cases."); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 1985) ("We have previ-
ously held that such statistical proof alone cannot ordinarily establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment under Title VII or § 1981."); Davis v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 330
(D.D.C. 2005) (holding that plaintiff's workforce statistics were insufficient to show em-
ployer's articulated reason for denying promotion was a pretext for discrimination).
149 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
150 Id. at 543.
151 Id. at 544.
[Vol. 42
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workplace because it often reflects unstated bias, unless some other fac-
tor such as the unavailability of qualified group members can be shown to
exist. "'52 But Title VII does not impose the symmetrical abstraction of in-
sisting that a proportionate representation of protected class members
precludes a finding of discrimination.
The Marietta analysis was applied to racial discrimination in 1978,
albeit without citation to Marietta itself. In Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters53 the Supreme Court stated that a "racially balanced work force
cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimi-
nation."' 54 This is because Title VII is designed to address the individual's
experience of discrimination. The Court noted in Furnco, "It is clear be-
yond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal
opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether
members of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in
the work force."'55 Nor is Furnco an outdated articulation of discrimina-
tion jurisprudence, given the Court's reliance upon this particular prem-
ise in the 2000 case of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc. 156 To
be sure, Furnco does note that a court may consider the racial mix of the
workforce in making a determination about the existence of discrimina-
tory motive because the composition of the workforce "is not wholly ir-
relevant on the issue of intent."' 57 However, that is far from treating work-
force composition data as conclusively demonstrating the absence of dis-
criminatory intent. Such an equivalence is prohibited by Furnco.155
152 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
153 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
114 Id. at 579.
"I Id. Contrast the diversity defense use of aggregate workforce statistics with the en-
trenched treatment of individual disparate treatment claims as unique to the plaintiff so that the
aggregate treatment of a class action certification is rarely possible. See, e.g., Abron v.
Black & Decker, Inc., 654 F.2d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1981) (concluding that plaintiff's claim
was "a solitary one that could not support a class certification"); see also Melissa Hart,
Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 787-88
(2005) (describing judicial hostility toward class action certification in disparate treatment
cases).
156 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) ("[T]he other evidence on which the court relied-that
Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent employed
many managers over age 50-although relevant, is certainly not dispositive." (citing Furnco,
438 U.S. at 580)).
"I' Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580.
18 Id.; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982) (holding that for dis-
parate impact claims it is immaterial that "bottom-line" hiring results were racially balanced
and concluding that this balance does not preclude a Title VII violation for application of a
facially discriminatory policy to an individual plaintiff). The doctrinal focus on discrimina-
tion against an individual, as opposed to the diversity of the workplace, is also reflected in
the prohibition against the use of race norming. Race norming is any adjustment of test
scores to diminish the disproportionate impact on racial minorities. Section 106 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 prohibits it. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2000). Although race norm-
ing could be used to ensure a racially integrated workforce, it is prohibited by law because
Title VII focuses on discrimination, not diversity.
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Arrocha disregards Furnco and other Supreme Court precedent re-
jecting the premise that a racially balanced workforce conclusively dem-
onstrates the absence of discriminatory intent. The only juridical support
cited in Arrocha for the premise that "diversity ... undercuts an inference of
discriminatory intent"'5 9 is a reference to Chambers v. TRM Copy Center
Corp."6 Chambers is another inter-ethnic employment discrimination case
in which the appellate court opinion discussed in passing how a court might
assess the ethnic makeup of a workforce.
In Chambers, a "black person of dark skin and Jamaican national ori-
gin" alleged employment discrimination based on race and national ori-
gin when he received a letter of reprimand from his African American
supervisor.16 The appellate court recognized that an inference of no dis-
crimination might be appropriate where the ethnic makeup of the work-
force was particularly varied 62 and there was no direct proof of discrimi-
natory animus, as is sometimes provided by racially invidious remarks by
supervisors and coworkers. Yet the court was also careful to note that the
diverse workforce composition would not be dispositive in all contexts.
"[I]f, for example, the company had sought to downsize its operation and
chose to do so by firing only one or more of its minority employees," evi-
dence of a racially balanced workforce would not be salient.' 63 In fact, the
appellate court in Chambers ultimately vacated the defendant's summary
judgment victory. The court remanded for trial because the plaintiff's dis-
charge, absent concrete reasons, occurred in circumstances that permitted
a rational factfinder to infer invidious discrimination regardless of the work-
force's racial composition) 6'
In short, while Chambers inaccurately assesses the ability of a racially
balanced workforce to support an inference of no discriminatory animus,
its overarching import is the need to examine all factors in context before
coming to any conclusions. In fact, Chambers has been relied upon by
the Southem District of New York for the proposition that "a diverse work-
force in itself does not preclude the finding of an inference of discrimina-
tion." 6 Yet the Eastern District of New York, which decided Arrocha,
continues to use Chambers as support for the premise that diversity un-
dercuts an inference of discrimination in a manner that equates diversity
with the absence of discrimination. 6  This equivalence is struck despite
159 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).
160 Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctr. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 1994).
161 Id. at 32.
162 The twelve-person workforce comprised "5 Caucasian, 4 African-American or dark-
skinned West Indians (including the plaintiff and the Service Center Manager), 2 Asians,
and I Hispanic." Id. at 33.
163 Id. at 38.
164 Id. at 40.
165 Thompson v. Am. Eagle Airlines, No. 99 Civ. 4529 (JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14932, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2000).
'66 See Subramanian v. Prudential Sec., No. CV-0l-6500(SJF)(RLM), 2003 U.S. Dist.
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its contravention of social science, its conflict with Supreme Court prece-
dent, and the implicit rejection of the premise by an earlier Second Circuit
decision. 16
7
What then might account for the maverick judicial use of bald dialecti-
cal reasoning and little else 68 to assert that diversity necessarily indicates
the absence of discrimination? Perhaps the diversity defense judges have
taken their cue from the dicta in Justice Scalia's majority opinion in St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,169 an example of the rhetorical power of
the diversity defense to dismiss a suggestion of discrimination.
D. The New Push for Doctrinal Symmetry in the Treatment of Workforce
Composition Data
In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that once an employer produces
evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment ac-
tion, it is immaterial whether the trier of fact is persuaded of the veracity
of the proffered nondiscriminatory reason. The mere production of the
nondiscriminatory reason is sufficient to rebut the presumption of inten-
tional discrimination from the plaintiff's prima facie case. This is because
the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times.
In response to the dissent's abhorrence of accepting at face value the proffer
of any specious nondiscriminatory reason by an employer, Justice Scalia
provides the following hypothetical for consideration:
Assume that 40% of a business' workforce are members of a par-
ticular minority group, a group which comprises only 10% of the
relevant labor market. An applicant, who is a member of that
group, applies for an opening for which he is minimally qualified,
but is rejected by a hiring officer of that same minority group,
LEXIS 23231, at *7, *23 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2003) (asserting that given diversity in de-
fendant's workforce, where an Asian plaintiff from India worked with Korean, African
American, Hispanic, and White-Anglo coworkers, the plaintiff's burden of proof was height-
ened).
167 Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991) (conclud-
ing that the absence of statistical significance can simply reflect the use of a small sample size
and cannot be equated with the absence of a correlation between race and employment
decisions).
168 While courts do have broad discretion in their ability to take judicial notice of legis-
lative facts that relate to the interpretation of applicable law, this discretion does not au-
thorize courts to ignore relevant legal precedents. See the FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory
committee note suggesting that courts should be free to initiate independent research for
legislative facts and take judicial notice of them. But because the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence do not supply guidance as to how legislative facts should be incorporated into a case
(in contrast to the guidance set forth in FED. R. EVID. 201(a) for incorporating adjudicative
facts), with legislative facts a judge has a dangerous freedom to create new law inappropri-
ately. See Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a Book Out...": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption
of Legislative Facts, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1539, 1541, 1598 (1987) (proposing a tradition of
care standard for regulating judicial use of legislative facts).
169 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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and the search to fill the opening continues. . . . Under the dis-
sent's interpretation of our law ... [t]he disproportionate minor-
ity makeup of the company's workforce and the fact that its hir-
ing officer was of the same minority group as the plaintiff will be
irrelevant, because the plaintiff's case can be proved indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unwor-
thy of credence .... [I]t is a mockery of justice to say that if the
jury believes the reason they set forth is probably not the "true"
one, all the utterly compelling evidence that discrimination was
not the reason will then be excluded from the jury's considera-
tion. 170
While the hypothetical is pure dicta, it is most interesting to note
that both the majority and the dissent refer to the hypothetical construc-
tion of a disproportionate minority makeup of the workforce and the pres-
ence of a racial minority hiring officer as indicating the absence of dis-
crimination. This is evidenced by Scalia's reference to the hypothetical as
"utterly compelling evidence that discrimination was not the reason," '171
and the dissent's characterization that the hypothetical employer could
easily prove a "nondiscriminatory reason it almost certainly must have had,
given the facts assumed."' 72
In short, despite the lack of precedent or statistics doctrinal, both the
Court's opinion and the dissent are caught up in their own intuitive notion
that a diverse workforce is a barometer for nondiscrimination and that
racial minorities cannot harbor racial bias themselves. The majority opin-
ion and the dissent can be characterized as based upon intuition to the
extent established Title VII doctrine has not similarly applied a symmet-
rical approach to proof of discrimination and nondiscrimination. For in-
stance, the use of anecdotal evidence is treated differently when presented
for purposes of proving discrimination than when presented to prove non-
discrimination."' Anecdotal evidence can be considered strong evidence of
intentional discrimination. 174 In contrast, anecdotal evidence of nondiscrimi-
nation carries little evidentiary weight.175 The justification for the asym-
metrical approach to anecdotal evidence is the same one that supports the
use of a prima facie inference of discrimination in disparate treatment
cases-namely, the understanding that discriminatory intent is often con-
cealed-and necessitates the admission of circumstantial evidence and
17 0 Id. at 513-14 & n.5 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
171 Id. at 514.
172 Id. at 539 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173 See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 145, § 3.01 n.2 ("[C]ourts tend to rely on
anecdotal evidence only when it cuts in favor of the plaintiff .... ").
'74 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342-43 n.24 (1977).
175 Id. Anecdotal evidence of nondiscrimination may include employer statements that
it does not discriminate. PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 145, § 3.01 n.2.
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the use of inferences to enforce the mandate against discrimination. This
is not the case for disputing an allegation of discrimination. It is a straight-
forward matter for an employer to present evidence of actual bases for em-
ployment decisions. There is no need for inferences from statistical data
or anecdotal evidence, nor would such evidence be probative given the very
strong possibility that discriminatory motive can coexist with such statis-
tical data and anecdotal evidence. In contrast, this nation's history of ra-
cial inequality has shown that in the absence of a concrete explanation,
the inference of discrimination is an accurate indicator for the actual ex-
istence of discrimination. 7 6 Scalia's hypothetical in Hicks reveals the extent
to which a disregard for the contemporary significance of the nation's his-
tory of racism can undermine the justifications for the asymmetrical use
of inference and other evidentiary tools.'77 Moreover, it demonstrates how
the Court is unacquainted with, or perhaps disinterested in, the manifes-
tation of discrimination within diverse settings and amongst racial minori-
ties themselves, and is thus just as subject to the obfuscation of diversity
rhetoric as lower courts. In fact, the general jurisprudential movement of
narrowing the applicability of antidiscrimination law provides a hospita-
ble setting for the growth of the diversity defense.'78 Indeed, the narrow
vision suggested by the Hicks hypothetical is in direct contrast to Supreme
Court precedent.
In Castaneda v. Partida,179 the Court stated that "it would be unwise
to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group
will not discriminate against other members of their group."1 80 Castaneda
is also particularly relevant given its rejection of the governing majority
defense to discrimination that resonates with the equally specious diver-
sity defense. The governing majority theory asserts that a prima facie case of
discrimination can be rebutted with the proof that racial minorities were
176 See Fumco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (describing the McDon-
nell Douglas use of inference for finding discrimination as a "sensible, orderly way to evaluate
the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimi-
nation") (emphasis added).
117 Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283 (1997) (explaining how the original structures for proving
discrimination "functioned properly only when the courts applying them were willing to
see discrimination as a viable explanation for social and political conditions" connected to
a history that "suggested that discrimination was the most likely explanation"); see also Susan
Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Dis-
crimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 1031 (1999) ("To base Supreme Court
precedent on a hypothetical that bears little resemblance to reality is strikingly ill ad-
vised."); John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law: Slouch-
ing Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709, 747 (2002)
("Scalia's hypothetical is telling. Apart from having absolutely nothing to do with the case
he is deciding, Scalia's hypothetical reveals he believes that most discrimination cases do
not involve discrimination at all.").
"'
7 See AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEW
STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan et al. eds., 2006).
179 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
'
80 Id. at 499.
20071
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the governing majority of decisionmakers involved. In Castaneda, the Su-
preme Court rejected out of hand the notion that a prima facie case of dis-
criminatory intent based on the exclusion of Mexican Americans from the
grand jury could be rebutted with proof that three of the five jury com-
missioners were Mexican American.' 8'
Yet despite the clearly articulated precedents of Castaneda82 and Furn-
co, which disentangle notions of diversity from proof of nondiscrimination,
the Hicks opinion presents a hypothetical that recharacterizes diversity as
the equivalent of nondiscrimination. As one employment discrimination
scholar notes about the case, "[lt]o base Supreme Court precedent on a hypo-
thetical that bears little resemblance to reality is strikingly ill advised."'8 3
Moreover, by requiring plaintiffs to provide actual proof of discriminatory
intent even after showing that a defendant's rebuttal was not credible, Hicks
gives judges vast discretion to create their own definitions of what consti-
tutes discrimination," undermining the adjudicatory force of the prima facie
proof established by McConnell Douglas v. Green. As civil rights scholar
John Valery White astutely observes:
Because Hicks and Reeves now require plaintiffs to produce evi-
dence of discriminatory intent, judges must specifically decide
181 Id. at 500.
112 Over the years, Castaneda has been relied upon as viable precedent regarding the
inapplicability of a governing majority defense to discrimination. See Castaneda v. Pickard,
648 F.2d 989, 1004 (5th Cir. 1981); Ausler v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1024,
1031 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Eccleston v. Sec'y of the Navy, 700 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D.D.C. 1988).
In addition, social scientists have continued to document the persistence of intraracial preju-
dice, which refutes the skepticism about its existence expressed by Justice Powell's dis-
senting opinion in Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 518 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("There is for me a
sense of unreality when Justices here in Washington decide solely on the basis of infer-
ences from statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers of power in this
remote border county are manipulating them to discriminate 'against themselves."'). See WIL-
LIAM E. CROSS, JR., SHADES OF BLACK: DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY (1991)
(exploring the relationship between racial identity attitudes and internalized racism in Af-
rican Americans); Aaron C. Cargile, Attitudes Toward Chinese-Accented Speech: An Inves-
tigation in Two Contexts, 16 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 434 (1997) (describing nega-
tive attitudes of Asian Americans toward Mandarin-Chinese-accented English within a college
classroom); Marta I. Cruz-Janzen, Lives on the Crossfire: The Struggle of Multiethnic and
Multiracial Latinos for Identity in a Dichotomous and Racialized World, 9 RACE, GENDER
& CLASS 47 (2002) (discussing Latinos' internalization of bias against dark-skinned Lati-
nos).
183 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 177, at 1031.
'11 White, supra note 177, at 759 ("Through a minor adjustment in proof structures,
Hicks has unleashed district courts to answer these questions on their own, through judges'
imposition of their own definition of race, discrimination, and appropriate workplace be-
havior."); see also Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting it Right: Uncertainty and Error in the
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1996) (describing the post-
Hicks prima facie case assessment as "the fact-finder's perceived prevalence of intentional
discrimination in society"); Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond
Intent Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1469, 1525 (2005) ("Instead, the Court has unleashed
the factfinder into a world of causal inquiry that is subject to the very biases, stereotypes,
and misconceptions that underlie the discrimination of which the plaintiff complains.").
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what acts constitute race acts and which do not. With neither guid-
ance from above, nor coherent categories with which to work,
judges after Hicks are empowered to answer these questions ac-
cording to their own theories of life.'85
Indeed, after Hicks, district court judges are certainly assessing summary
judgment motions through the lenses of their own particular understanding
of discrimination. 8 6 Unfortunately, that understanding seems to be increas-
ingly influenced by public discourse that presents racial diversity as the
equivalent of racial harmony. 87 The Arrocha case discussed in Section II.B
above is an example of a judge who concocts a diversity defense to dis-
crimination based on his own perspectives of what constitutes discrimi-
nation. 88
E. Diversity and the Presumed Interchangeability of Latinos
The diversity defense in the Arrocha case is problematic in its inco-
herent understanding of employment discrimination law's application of
statistical analysis and of Supreme Court precedents related to the issue.
Furthermore, in dismissing the national origin claim because the Afro-Pana-
manian plaintiff's employer reappointed natives from other South and Cen-
tral American countries instead of him, the Arrocha court treats all Latinos
as interchangeable and incapable of national-origin discrimination against
other Latinos. 89 The mistaken treatment of the panethnic identifier of Latino/
Hispanic as precluding discrimination between various Latinos is also pre-
sent in other Latino inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases. 9 ' This,
85 White, supra note 177, at 727.
86 Id. at 716 ("In general Hicks was blamed for initiating a considerably more suspi-
cious view of Title VII claims and unleashing federal judges to reject claims on summary
judgment when the facts were unpersuasive to the judge.").
87 See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
188 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).
189 The presumed interchangeability of Latinos in employment discrimination cases re-
sembles the judicial treatment of color-bias claims brought by African Americans. Specifical-
ly, courts have difficulty identifying the manifestation of discrimination within African
American communities when assessing color-based discrimination claims brought by per-
sons of African ancestry. This is because judges presume that all persons of African ances-
try are viewed as the same regardless of skin color or ethnicity. The presumed sameness of
African ancestry obscures the analysis of colorism claims. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Col-
orism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1731 (2000) (discussing the influence
of the rule of hypo-descent on the judicial application of color-discrimination doctrine to
persons of African ancestry); see also Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin
Color, 49 DUKE L.J, 1487, 1544 (2000) (noting that it can be difficult for a court "to be-
lieve that a person who hires Blacks will engage in discrimination against other Blacks, or
that a person who is Black would discriminate against another Black person").
190 See, e.g., Patino v. Rucker, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29691 (2d Cir. July 25, 1997). In
this case a Puerto Rican porter for Columbia University alleged that he was discharged by
his Hispanic supervisor and replaced with another Latino porter, in violation of Title VII of
2007]
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of course, directly contravenes the Supreme Court mandate in Castaneda
not to presume that intra-ethnic and intraracial discrimination cannot exist.' 9'
Treating Latinos as interchangeable also denies them protection against
national origin discrimination when the employer's agents are Latinos as
well. The Supreme Court's own definition of national origin as referring "to
the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from
which his or her ancestors came,"'192 conflicts with the way the diversity
defense lumps all Latinos into one undifferentiated group. 193 Certainly,
where a White-Anglo employer is alleged to have discriminated against a
Latino, the binary White-Anglo-versus-Latino context may justify the sim-
ple reference to the plaintiff as a "Latino" or "Hispanic" with standing to
bring a national-origin claim.' 94 However, where a Latino plaintiff from a
the Civil Rights Act. In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the judge
noted that the plaintiff failed to respond to the defendant's persuasive "evidence" that the
plaintiff had previously replaced a Hispanic employee, that the accused supervisor was His-
panic, and that 90% of the employees in the department were Hispanic. Informing the diver-
sity defense in Patino is the view of the Hispanic category as a racial unifier that prevents
group members from being biased against one another. The notion that Latinos are a ra-
cially mixed people may also be informing the court's assessment.
191 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) ("[I]t would be unwise to presume
as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against
other members of their group.").
192 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973); see id. at 89 ("The only direct
definition given the phrase 'national origin' is the following remark made on the floor of
the House of Representatives by Congressman Roosevelt, Chairman of the House Sub-
committee which reported the bill: 'It means the country from which you or your forebears
came."'); see also Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica,
C.J., concurring) (noting that a plaintiff with a national-origin claim must "trace ancestry
to a nation outside of the United States" and thus a "Confederate Southern-American" is
not a valid national-origin class under Title VII). But see Earnhardt v. Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 744 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that in Puerto Rico a plaintiff born in
the continental United States can assert a national-origin discrimination claim). For an in-
depth critique of the current limitations of the legal definition for national origin, see
Perea, supra note 132, at 857 (proposing that Congress legislate an expansive definition of
"national origin" that includes discrimination based upon ethnic traits such as alienage status
and language preference).
193 See Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as'Race and
Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 73 (1998) (detailing the ways Latinos are inap-
propriately depicted as a homogeneous group). Symbolic homogenization is not restricted to
Latinos. See Aaron Celious & Daphna Oyserman, Race From the Inside: An Emerging
Heterogeneous Race Model, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 149, 150-53 (2001) (describing how African
Americans are often presented as a homogeneous group despite the ways social, economic,
gender, and physical traits vary the racial experiences of different African Americans).
194 It is probably for this very purpose that while the EEOC does not define national
origin, it chooses to define national origin discrimination "broadly as including, but not
limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or
her ancestor's place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or lin-
guistic characteristics of a national origin group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2007) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, at least one district court has permitted Latino plaintiffs to bring
national-origin discrimination allegations based upon their "Spanish-speaking characteris-
tic" alone where a White-Anglo defendant may have had no actual knowledge of the plain-
tiff's exact place of origin, but instituted policies that disparately impacted and discrimi-
nated based upon the foreignness of the plaintiffs. See Alemendares v. Palmer, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23258, at *31 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2002) ("Because plaintiffs have linguistic
296
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particular country is alleging national-origin discrimination at the hands
of a Latino from another country of origin, it would be nonsensical to ignore
the distinctions in country of origin. Similarly, it would defy logic to pre-
sume that an employer's preference for one Latino over another should
insulate the employer from an inquiry about discriminatory intent. Such
an interpretation of antidiscrimination jurisprudence would, like the emerg-
ing diversity defense to discrimination, be yet another misplaced applica-
tion of symmetry to the doctrine. 95
Supreme Court precedent should temper any district court inclination to
presume symmetrically that because the replacement of a discharged ra-
cially excluded employee with a White employee gives rise to a prima facie
case of discrimination, 9 6 the replacement of a discharged racially ex-
cluded employee with another racially excluded employee is, in turn, proof
of nondiscriminatory intent on the part of the employer. In O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., the Supreme Court explicitly held in
the context of age discrimination that it is immaterial that a statutorily pro-
tected class member was replaced by someone who is also a protected class
member.'97 Because O'Connor entailed a development of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie standard for discrimination, 9 ' its discussion of pro-
tected class member replacements in the age discrimination context is
analytically applicable to race discrimination cases.'99
Unfortunately, the treatment of Latinos of varying racial and ethnic
backgrounds as a homogeneous group also adversely influences the analysis
characteristics of a particular national origin group-as required in the EEOC's definition
of 'national origin discrimination'-they have sufficiently pled a claim of national origin
discrimination. Plaintiffs' Spanish-speaking characteristics reflect their national origin.").
"I See supra notes 173-181 and accompanying text.
196 A number of jurisdictions have concluded that proof that a protected class member
has been unfavorably treated relative to someone not in the protected class can be an ele-
ment of a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d
683, 690 (6th Cir. 2004) (requiring reverse-discrimination plaintiffs to prove that other
employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class were
more favorably treated in order to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination); Sledge v.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1015 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(noting that part of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is showing that em-
ployer either filled plaintiff's position with a person not of the same racial minority or left
the position open); Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (requiring as an
element of a prima facie case of discrimination proof either that someone not of the plain-
tiffs' protected class filled the position or that the position remained vacant).
197 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) ("The fact that one person in the protected class has lost
out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out
because of his age.").
198 Id. at 312 ("Because it lacks probative value, the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was re-
placed by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case.").
'99 See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(applying O'Connor to a Title VII racial discrimination case). "Laws against discrimina-
tion protect persons, not classes, the Court remarked, an observation with equal force in a
case under the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id.; see also Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., 191 F.3d
344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying O'Connor to a Title VII gender discrimination case).
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of the nature of Latino inter-ethnic discrimination that cannot be addressed
by O'Connor alone. For instance, the interchangeability of Latinos' per-
spectives in Arrocha completely fails to appreciate the ways in which
internal Latino national origin bias is rooted in a racialized hierarchy of
Latin American countries, where countries perceived as European are
viewed as more advanced than those more significantly populated with
people of indigenous descent or those of African descent."° In the list of
countries the judge thought equivalent, Latin American racial constructs
would rank Argentina as a highly valued White country, followed by Peru
and Mexico with their indigenous populations, followed by the Domini-
can Republic and the plaintiff's own country of origin, Panama, because they
are populated by more people of African descent. For Latinos influ-enced by
Latin American racial paradigms where each country has a racial identifica-
tion, a diverse workforce of Latinos is not the immediate equivalent of a
bias-free context. Nor is a color preference divorced from a racialized
ideology within the Latino context.20 Diversity means something more nu-
anced to people of color, who do not view all ethnic groups as the same
simply because they are non-White. The public discourse about diversity as
a panacea for racial discrimination overlooks the complexity of actual diver-
sity.
Part of the difficulty that judges have in disentangling notions of di-
versity from discrimination may stem from overlooking the operation of
what Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati term "working identity."2 °2 Carbado
and Gulati assert that judges utilize such a narrow conception of what race is
that they often disregard the extent to which racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion manifests itself not simply by a plaintiff's membership in a protected
class, but also by an employer's stereotyped expectations about "racial
conduct.'203 To be precise, Carbado and Gulati theorize that discrimination
in a diverse setting can occur when the least racially assimilated employee
200 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
201 See DE GENOVA & RAMOS-ZAYAS, supra note 106, at 214 (describing how "intra-
Latino divisions seem always to be entrenched in the hegemonic denigration of African
Americans" and blackness).
202 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUEs 701, 702 (2001) ("Understanding the relationship between discrimination and per-
formance, we argue, is crucial to developing a plausible and coherent theory of discrimina-
tion."); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259
(2000); accord Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination
by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004) (arguing that Title VII
has been misinterpreted to exclude those cases in which employees are disparately treated
based upon racially specific grooming choices that are integral to racial identity).
203 Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 202, at 1262; see also Barbara J.
Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking,
104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995) (describing the ways in which Whites' lack of consciousness
of having a race disconnects them from recognizing the full spectrum of their racialized
decisionmaking when assessing the conduct of employees who do not conform to expecta-
tions of racial assimilation within predominantly White workplaces).
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or prospective employee is targeted for disparate treatment. 2°, One exam-
ple that Carbado and Gulati provide is of a law school faculty inclined to
exclude any female Asian American teaching candidate whose conduct does
not challenge the stereotype of "Asian-American females as lacking au-
thority and being quiet and submissive. '20 5 If the law school faculty were
instead to hire another Asian American female candidate whose racial per-
formance was more visibly commanding and vocal, it would not vitiate
the disparate treatment that the faculty accorded the first candidate based
on their unconscious stereotypes. "To make this concrete, if ten black em-
ployees are up for promotion, and nine are promoted, a court should still
not negate the possibility that the tenth was denied a promotion because
of his race: The other nine employees may have been engaged in racially
palatable identity performances. '26 Judicial willingness to inquire into
the possibility of discrimination in an individual instance of racial exclusion
within an otherwise "diverse" workplace setting will depend upon jurists'
attention to what racial differences an employer finds acceptable and unac-
ceptable, and the ways in which that calculus itself is discrimination. 27 Cer-
204
An employer that has a record of promoting black employees is likely to persuade
a court that insufficient evidence of racial animus exists. The court assumes that
because the employer thinks that some blacks are "good," the reason the employer
thought the plaintiff was "bad" had nothing to do with the plaintiff's race. The
court is likely to conclude that the reason for the termination was simply the em-
ployer's dislike of the individual, which does not produce an actionable discrimi-
nation case.
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 202, at 1298.20 1 d. at 1272.
206 Id. at 1298.
207 One example of a judge who demonstrates an understanding of the implications of a
racial performance in working identity can be found in Davis v. Boykin Mgmt. Co., 1994
WL 714517, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1994):
[A]n employer might tolerate outspokenness in his white employees but find ob-
jectionable a comparable lack of reserve by a black employee because of a feeling
that blacks should "know their place." If his solution is to fire the outspoken black
in favor of a more docile or reserved black employee, his action obviously still is
discriminatory even though the position was not filled by a "non-protected class
member."
One scholar has raised concerns about using employment discrimination doctrine to
address issues of racial assimilation. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRI-
TIQUE 189 (2005) (concluding that an assimilation focus in employment discrimination doc-
trine "invites confusion as to the underlying purpose and practical application of disparate
impact doctrine and ultimately ill serves the broader social goals of reducing underrepre-
sentation and segregation in the workplace"). Yet a singular doctrinal focus on proportional
representation in the workplace that ignores questions of racial assimilation could ulti-
mately undermine the goal of eradicating racially biased decisionmaking. That is why Kenji
Yoshino proposes that employer demands to "act White" be addressed by requiring em-
ployers to offer a rational reason for coercing conformity. Yoshino in fact states that "cov-
ering demands are the modem form of subordination." KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HID-
2007]
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tainly, the EEOC's recent settlement agreements in cases in which em-
ployers have categorically preferred one non-White racial group over an-
other non-White racial group attests to the fact that employer stereotypes
about preferred racial conduct do exist. 208 It is thus not unlikely that em-
ployer racial conduct preferences also inform those diverse work settings
in which an individual from one racial/ethnic group is disparately treated
from an individual from another racial/ethnic group, such as in Arrocha.
Unfortunately, the misconstrued application of diversity discourse is
not limited to the isolated case of intra-racial bias among Latino subgroup
members, as in Arrocha. Although Arrocha serves as the paradigmatic ex-
ample of all the deficiencies of the diversity defense, the deficiencies also
manifest themselves in varying ways in other reported Latino inter-ethnic
employment discrimination cases in which the alleged bias is instead
amongst Latinos and other people of color (most often African Americans).
For example, in Sprott v. Franco,z°9 an African American woman who
worked as deputy director of the New York City Housing Authority's
Office of Equal Opportunity alleged that her Hispanic supervisor harassed
her and denied her salary increases because of her race. In dismissing the
plaintiff's claim upon defendant's request for summary judgment, the judge
noted that the facts failed to raise an inference of discrimination because
"the new Director is an Hispanic woman .... There are now two deputy
directors-one African-American and one Caucasian .... The remaining
staff is comprised of [sic] twenty-four Hispanics, twenty-three African
Americans, nine Caucasians, and one person categorized as 'other.""'2 "
Thus, the judge accorded a diverse workplace and the supervisor's Hispanic
status great power to circumvent racism, without questioning what diver-
sity actually means in the new demographic social order. While some judges
mistakenly assert that the existence of a diverse workplace may undercut
a claim about discriminatory hiring practices, it certainly has no relevance to
a claim about an individual plaintiff's racial harassment and pay raise
disputes. Yet this court conflates those two contexts in ways that seem to
presume that Latino coworkers and diverse workplaces cannot be bearers
of racism.
In Bernard v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,2 1 1 the di-
versity defense is raised again by a district court judge, albeit more sub-
tly. In a pro se application the plaintiff, a self-described dark-skinned Black
woman born in Trinidad, alleged that she had been terminated from her posi-
DEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 177 (2006). "If civil rights law fails to protect these
groups against coerced conformity, it will have stopped short of its end." Id. at 178.
20 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
209 Sprott v. Franco, 1998 WL 472061 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1998) (Section 1981 employment
discrimination claim).
210 Id. at *6.
211 Bernard v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 1996 WL 457284 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14,
1996).
[Vol. 42
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tion as an administrative assistant because of her race, color, and national
origin. In dismissing her case upon motion for summary judgment by the
defendant employer, the court took pains to note that the plaintiff's for-
mer work environment had been an "ethnically diverse office" staffed pre-
dominantly by Hispanic and African American women. 21 2 Although the
plaintiff alleged several instances of negative interactions with her Puerto
Rican manager and other Latina co-workers, the court was persuaded to re-
solve the dispute on summary judgment. The court based its decision on
the fact that the associate personnel director, who never previously had any
contact with the plaintiff, independently concluded that the plaintiff should
be terminated after reviewing all the records and hearing statements at a
disciplinary meeting. Why is this personnel director's opinion so significant
to the court? The court opinion noted that at the disciplinary meeting
"Ms. Gloria Simmons ... the Associate Personnel Director, presided in
her capacity as Labor Relations Officer .... Simmons who is black, had
no contact with Bernard prior to the meeting. '213 As Ms. Simmons was
never identified as a party to the discrimination, there is no legally relevant
reason for identifying her racial affiliation. Instead, the racial identification
is situated in the opinion as a mechanism for attesting to the absence of any
discrimination in the workplace. In other words, if a Black woman found
there was no discrimination then there could not have been any discrimina-
tion. Her racial minority status raises her credibility and is part of the rhe-
torical understanding that diverse workplaces are somehow impervious to
racism.
The influence of diversity-as-antidote-to-discrimination discourse has
also surfaced in a defendant's proffer of proof of nondiscriminatory intent.
For instance, in EEOC v. Rodriguez,24 the EEOC filed a pattern and prac-
tice discrimination case based upon an automobile dealership's failure
and refusal to hire African Americans as salespersons. The automobile deal-
ership was owned by a man of Spanish and Italian ancestry. The EEOC
amassed a significant amount of evidence about the owner's stated policy
of not hiring African Americans as salespersons215 and his promotion of a
racially hostile environment. 21 6 Yet despite the wealth of evidence demon-
212 Id. at *2.
213 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
214 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1649 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 1994).
215 Id. The evidence included testimony regarding racist commentary at the workplace,
such as "I don't care how good that nigger is, he will never work here." There was also testi-
mony that other dark-skinned ethnic group members would only be hired upon demonstrat-
ing they were not African American. For instance, an East Indian applicant whose skin color
was disfavorably contrasted against a dark-colored desk as a test for acceptable skin color
was told that the managers might still be able to hire him because he was Indian and not
African American. Similarly, a dark-skinned Mexican employee salesperson was saved from
being fired by a manager who thought he was Black when another manager explained, "It's
ok, he's not black, he's Mexican."
216 Id. Sales meetings often contained verbal references to "niggers." Other racially dis-
paraging terms included "nigger," "sand nigger," "we-bes," "I-be," "large lips," "fucking
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strating the employer's discriminatory practices, the defendant claimed he
could not be "prejudiced" against African Americans because he had been
the subject of discrimination himself. He asserted that his own ethnic
heritage as a Spaniard exposed him to racism and thereby inoculated him
against being racist. While the defense ultimately failed amidst the signifi-
cant evidence of discrimination, the defendant's decision to assert his own
ethnic diversity as a defense highlights the potential for continued misap-
plication of diversity discourse in employment discrimination litigation.
F Diversity and the "Cultural Misunderstanding" Dismissal
of Discrimination
If many judges in these emerging cases do not view inter-ethnic dis-
crimination as actual discrimination, what do they believe the cases de-
scribe? Two workplace narratives seem to suggest that decisionmakers may
instead read inter-ethnic discrimination claims as instances of mere cul-
tural misunderstanding. A July 2004 report from a human resources di-
rector provides a helpful illustration:
I was called in because a small work team in a laboratory was not
meeting deadlines on an important project. On the surface it
looked like a time management issue to their supervisor when in
fact, two Hispanic employees on the team had issues that were
culturally rooted-one being Puerto Rican and the other being
Dominican. Their issues were getting in the way of the team's pro-
gress. While unfortunate and inaccurate, people who were work-
ing with and supervising these employees never thought some-
thing diversity-related was going on. It never came up on their ra-
dar screens because they saw both employees as "Hispanic."2"7
This workplace case study illustrates two separate aspects of the opacity
of inter-ethnic disputes for decisionmakers. First, the supervisor simply
identifies a mere personality conflict between two Latino employees be-
cause of the presumption that all Latinos are part of a monolithic group.
Then, the human resources director, who is African American and asserts
knowledge about the existence of intra-racial bias within racial groups, is
better able to appreciate that two Latinos from different ethnic subgroups
can harbor group-based bias against one another. Yet even this human re-
sources director presumes that the conflict is simply "culturally rooted"
rather than informed by Latino racial ideology about the "inherent racial
differences" between Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. Thus, even when a
niggers," "hey buckwheat," and "hey boy."
"7 E-mail from Manager of Learning & Organizational Dev., to author (July 29, 2004)
(on file with author).
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workplace identifies inter-ethnic conflicts, it is not necessarily equipped
to appreciate that "culture" is not divorced from racism.
Cultural misunderstanding was also the explanatory factor in enter-
ing summary judgment against a plaintiff in Webb v. R&B Holding Co."' s
In Webb, an African American title clerk in a predominantly White-Hispanic
car dealership was often referred to as "la negra" (the black girl) and rep-
rimanded for being "rude. '21 9 In her complaint, the plaintiff noted that
other employees were not disciplined for rude behavior. In granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the judge chastised the plain-
tiff for filing the discrimination claim with the following reprimand:
Over the years, work environments have come to reflect our in-
creasingly multi-cultural world. With the coming together of nu-
merous diverse ethnicities and cultures in the common work-
place, there are bound to be not only many instances of cultural
harmony but also some occasions of cultural friction .... While
this Court sincerely hopes that all employees of all cultures will
choose to exercise common respect and courtesy, it cannot allow
Title VII to be used as a sword by which one culture may achieve
supremacy in the workplace over another"-by filing a Title VII
claim!22
The judicial assumption seems to be that when Latino workplace disputes
arise they are cultural misunderstandings and not rooted in racism. This
judicial assumption conflicts with the growing body of social science re-
search discussed in Section I of this Article, illustrating the racial stereo-
types that can exist within Latino communities. What is needed is a mecha-
nism for incorporating the realities of racial complexity demonstrated in
the social science research into antidiscrimination jurisprudence. This Arti-
cle proffers a Multiracial Racism Litigation Approach as one possible
mechanism for more effectively analyzing inter-ethnic employment dis-
crimination cases.
III. THE MRLA PROPOSAL: THE MULTIRACIAL RACISM
LITIGATION APPROACH
How can we add nuance to the jurisprudence of antidiscrimination to
make the new demography less opaque to factfinders and assist the judi-
ciary and others in identifying the new markers of racial discrimination?
2 21
218 Webb v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
219 The stereotyped characterization of Black women as rude has a long history. See
Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539.
220 Webb, 992 F. Supp. at 1389 (emphasis added).
221 The jurisprudential problem with Latino inter-ethnic discrimination cases identified
in this Article is also subject to all the pre-existing concerns that many scholars have de-
scribed regarding the growing limitations on proving employment discrimination cases. See,
20071
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The first step will need to be a mechanism for developing a fuller record
of inter-ethnic racial animus across groups. For judges who do not under-
stand racial discrimination unless a White-Anglo person is present as an
instigator or victim, pleadings will need to be more detailed, expert wit-
nesses will need to be brought in, and depositions will need to be more
expansive. In addition, judicial training sessions will need to be targeted
for curriculum reform to address inter-ethnic discrimination specifically.
But this cannot be done without judicial willingness to consider empiri-
cal data about the broader phenomenon of inter-ethnic bias and its con-
travention of the diversity defense.
A. The MRLA Method
One method for facilitating the judicial admission of inter-ethnic speci-
fic empirical data to defuse the application of the diversity defense is the
development of a "Multiracial Racism Litigation Approach" ("MRLA").
The MRLA is the mechanism for justifying the admission of data about
the details of a specific ethnic/racial group's racial attitudes that judges
might otherwise view as irrelevant to the judicial proceedings. In turn,
the MRLA can help judges to move beyond the veil of a diverse work-
place and summary conclusions of nonactionable "cultural misunderstand-
ing." This will then reinforce for judges the applicability of firmly estab-
lished employment discrimination doctrines to the context of inter-ethnic
discrimination.
The term "multiracial" in Multiracial Racism Litigation Approach both
describes the multiracial/multi-ethnic context of the cases and the ways
in which multiracial contexts can be imbued with racism even as they are
stereotyped as transcending race.222 Therefore, this Article will use the term
e.g., E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics : The Myth of the Protected Class in
Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441 (1998) ("Lower courts' reluc-
tance to apply the Supreme Court's formation of the prima facie case suggests a discomfort
with the explicit recognition of historical disadvantage that the prima facie presumption
entails."); Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HAND-
BOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 377, 393
(Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (concluding that Title VII needs to be
reformed to address "ingroup favoritism" as a form of discrimination); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second Genera-
tion Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
222 See Hernindez, Multiracial Matrix, supra note 37, at 1098 (describing the ways in
which racially diverse contexts are publicly depicted as resolving racial problems by tran-
scending race). This Article uses the term "multiracial" more expansively than do mixed-
race persons using it to denote racial identity. Yet the term does encompass the broader
societal notions about the presumed racial enlightenment of mixed-race persons and di-
verse racial demography. While the term "multiracial/multi-ethnic" is more descriptive, it
is also more cumbersome and less apt to capture the racialization that occurs in the mani-
festation of animus across groups characterized as ethnic. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1980s
(1986) (theorizing how the treatment of various ethnic groups in the United States is more
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"multiracial racism lens" to describe a conceptual focus on whether a
defendant's conduct is an assertion of racial privilege in a multiracial/multi-
ethnic diverse workplace setting. In a nutshell, the MRLA suggests that
inter-ethnic employment discrimination plaintiffs contextualize the dis-
crimination they allege by: (1) explicitly foregrounding the narrative with
the premise of inter-ethnic hierarchy and bias; (2) focusing the inquiry on
whether there were racially advantaged and disadvantaged employees
among the diverse non-White workers; (3) providing the social science
data about the specific racial attitudes; and (4) demonstrating the applicabil-
ity of established employment discrimination doctrine to diverse work-
places.
The MRLA is not a whole new theory about the origins of discrimi-
nation. 213 Instead, it is a tool for recognizing our current understandings
of discrimination when it occurs in a multiracial or an inter-ethnic con-
text. Just as eyeglasses assist a person to see more clearly images that al-
ready exist, the multiracial racism lens clarifies the discrimination that can
manifest in diverse workplaces. It does so by focusing the pre-existing
Title VII proof structure on the question of who is functionally privileged
and subjugated in a given context and time. 2 4 It provides needed context
for the application of the Title VII proof structures without altering them.
Plaintiffs will attempt to carry their traditional burden of demonstrating
how the alleged facts amount to discrimination, but will do so by focus-
ing on cultural and historical context. 225 Defendants will still have the same
opportunity for rebuttal by proffering a nondiscriminatory reason for the
accurately characterized as a series of "racial projects").
223 See, e.g., FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 126-78 (John J.
Donohue III ed., 2d ed. 2003) (delineating various theories of racial prejudice and discrimina-
tory conduct).
224 The understanding of racial privilege and disadvantage as fluid and thereby shifting
given a particular context and timeframe is embodied in Eric Yamamoto's concept of si-
multaneity. Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interra-
cial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 38 (1995). Yamamoto uses simultaneity to describe
how racially subordinated groups "contribute to and are responsible for the construction of
their own identities and sometimes oppressive inter-group relations." Id. In other words, a
racialized group can simultaneously be subordinated and a subordinator of others. Simi-
larly, Neil Gotanda's articulation of racial hierarchy incorporates the helpful perspective of
"racial stratification" which includes the model of a "hierarchical structure between mi-
norities," instead of a model that exclusively "emphasizes the subordinate position of all
racial and ethnic minorities." Neil Gotanda, Multiculturalism and Racial Stratification, in
MAPPING MULTICULTURALISM 238, 240 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds.,
1996) (emphasis omitted).
225 While the MRLA recommends that litigators provide a more extensive narrative in
their pleadings to include data about inter-ethnic racial animus in order to counteract the
diversity defense, the MRLA does not abrogate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
Because the MRLA is a suggested framework for litigation, it does not interfere with that
Rule's simple mandate for a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explic-
itly rejected a heightened pleading requirement for employment discrimination cases be-
cause it would conflict with this Rule. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
512 (2002).
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challenged employment decision, in addition to providing expert witnesses
of their own regarding the relevant cultural and historical context presented
by the plaintiff. As such, the MRLA is flexible enough to be applied to
inter-ethnic discrimination cases that do not involve Latino defendants.226
Indeed, it was Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan, a case not involving La-
tinos, in which a federal judge took this approach and came closest to
demanding that plaintiffs utilize what this Article characterizes as the
MRLA. 2
27
In Ali, a self-described light-skinned Pakistani citizen from the prov-
ince of Punjab employed at the National Bank of Pakistan's New York
branch alleged that the Bank discriminated against him in favor of darker-
skinned Pakistani citizens from the province of Sind. 2 1 In dismissing the
plaintiff's claim, the court noted that although light-skinned employees
predominated in the lower-paid job positions, it was problematic that no
"evidence by way of expert testimony or treatise was presented with respect
to color differences among the various provinces of Pakistan, or discrimina-
tion based on color."229 The court was disturbed by the lack of a fuller record
because it was unclear whether a light-skinned Pakistani who "is darker
in complexion than those commonly termed white in the United States 23 °
warranted "protected class status" under the McDonnell Douglas23 ' prima
facie evidentiary standard. The court stated:
Suffice it to note that the presumption of a protected class status
on the basis of color is bound up with an entire national racial
history. It may well be that there are indigenous discriminatory
practices around the world having nothing to do with the American
experience. However, there is no basis on this record for the recog-
nition of skin color as a presumptive discriminatory criterion
(rooted, one would suppose, in the intermingling of distinctive na-
tional or racial groups) in employment in Pakistan, or among Paki-
stanis in New York, under the McDonnell Douglas guidelines.232
In short, the judge is asserting that when Title VII cases are brought
that implicate racial meanings beyond the U.S. setting, a fuller record about
226 While Latino inter-ethnic claims are the focus of this Article, the MRLA, justifying
the admission of empirical data, should be just as helpful in explicating the context of non-
White-Anglo/African American allegations of discrimination. See, e.g., VIJAY PRASHAD,
THE KARMA OF BROWN FOLK (2000) (discussing the racial attitudes of Indians and their
anti-Black racism as well). See also GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE
(1954) (describing the ubiquitous and historically pervasive construction of "in-groups"
and "out-groups").
227 Ali v. Nat'l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
228 1d. at 613-14.
229 Id. at 612.230 Id.
231 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
232Ali, 508 F. Supp. at 613-14.
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those meanings should be set forth in order for the existing legal doctrine
to be applied effectively.
B. The MRLA Benefits
When specifically applied to the context of Latino inter-ethnic dis-
crimination with its empirical data regarding Latino anti-Black sentiment
and the idealization of whiteness, the MRLA enables an inquiry into the
manifestations of racial privilege with a focus on how a defendant's con-
duct positions him or her as an agent of White supremacy, while not be-
ing viewed as racially White himself or herself. This is because the MRLA
incorporates the understanding that systems and norms of White suprem-
acy do not disappear simply because the census count of racial Whites
has diminished.233 Indeed, the seduction of "performing whiteness" by
subjugating others continues to exist.234 This is because "intergroup conflict
233 See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA 30 (1996) (describing the need for employment discrimination
doctrine to acknowledge the importance of context in appreciating how "each of us lives at
the juncture of privilege in some areas and subordination in others"); L6pez, supra note 29,
at 93 (1998) (describing the process of racialization as subject to the varying contingencies
of time, place, and identity); see also John Valery White, The Turner Thesis, Black Migra-
tion, and the (Misapplied) Immigrant Explanation of Black Inequality, 5 NEV. L.J. 6, 24,
24-29 (2004) (describing the way in which the racial diversity of Northern California in
the 1940s, with its mixed population of Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino resi-
dents, still maintained a system of White privilege that thoroughly segregated African
Americans from most employment opportunities despite the absence of an official Jim Crow
system).
234 "Performing whiteness" in its most narrow interpretation is when individuals assert
their claim to a White racial identity by evidencing "whiteness in their character, religious
practices and beliefs, class orientation, language, ability to intermarry, and a host of other
traits that [have] nothing to do with intrinsic racial grouping." John Tehranian, Note, Perform-
ing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in Amer-
ica, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 821 (2000) (applying Judith Butler's work on gender and the per-
formance of identity to the analysis of judicial evaluations of immigrant petitions for natu-
ralization). But performing whiteness can also refer more generally to the ways in which
people of color engage in interracial distancing and attempt to "occupy both the marginal-
ized and the privileged ends of the Black/White paradigm." Devon W. Carbado, Race to the
Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1311 (2002). In this way, "discrimination becomes a strate-
gic tool manipulated" by one racial or ethnic group against another. Louis Herns Marcelin,
Identity, Power, and Socioracial Hierarchies Among Haitian Immigrants in Florida, in
NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 209, 223. In addition to self-conscious
attempts by individuals to assert a White identity or an elevated social status built on White
privilege, there is also the societal dynamic of particular ethnic groups being offered cer-
tain facets of White privilege in order to lessen their interest in forming alliances with other
racially subordinated groups. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CA-
NARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 227 (2002) ("By
offering this option of whiteness over time to selected nonblack nonwhites, the racial bi-
nary of black and white is preserved and race in the United States is made more manage-
able for those seeking to hold onto zero-sum power."). This can take the form of actually
incorporating new ethnic groups into the category of whiteness as was done with the Irish
over time. See NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995). It can also take
the form of treating particular groups as "honorary whites" in a particular place and time.
See Mark Sawyer, Racial Politics in Multiethnic America: Black and Latina/o Identities
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can [often] be best understood as the product of internalized white su-
premacy, 235 and the search for group-based status production. 23 6 Accord-
ingly, the MRLA seeks to infuse the analysis of inter-ethnic discrimina-
tion claims with the fundamental understanding that acts of racial discrimi-
nation preserve racial privilege for whoever is situated as racially valued
in any given context, and that such bias also furthers systemic White privi-
lege more generally, regardless of whether a self-identified White-Anglo
person is directly involved.237
For example, legal scholars who analyzed the 1992 Los Angeles riots
have noted the way in which both Koreans and African Americans were in
turn positioned as functionally White-privileged in nativist constructs of
the racial conflict in the public discourse.238 Korean Americans were de-
scribed as immigrant foreigners in opposition to African Americans with
"White" U.S. citizenship, a description that alternated with the descrip-
tion of Korean Americans as pursuing the American entrepreneurial dream
as Whites in opposition to African Americans as a socially problematic
Black underclass . 2 9 The MRLA can recognize the White privilege of non-
White groups in varying contexts.240 Rather than introducing further com-
plexity into employment discrimination cases, the MRLA builds upon the
knowledge judges already have about the operation of White privilege and
provides a language for describing its manifestation in non-White con-
texts.24" ' In addition, the vast literature regarding the legacies of colonial-
and Coalitions, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 265, 272 ("Hollywood
portrayals of [Puerto Rican actress Jennifer Lopez] emphasize the attempt to portray Lati-
nas/os as 'potential whites."'); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans
and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 226 & 249 (1995) (using the con-
cepts of "honorary whites" and "constructive blacks" to describe the public discourse
about affirmative action and the attempt to dissuade Asian Americans of their common
interests with African Americans). Some scholars assert that Latinos are particularly pre-
disposed to being "seduced into thinking [they] are White." Enid Trucio-Haynes, Why "Race
Matters:" Latcrit Theory and Latinalo Racial Identity, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 1 (2001).
235 Chris K. lijima, The Era of We-Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian
Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 75 (1997).
236 Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995) (theorizing that
individuals are driven in part by their competition for esteem and that racist behavior is a
process by which one racial group seeks to produce esteem for itself by lowering the status
of another group).
237 See WILDMAN, supra note 233, at 33 (emphasizing the need for employment dis-
crimination doctrine to include issues of privilege in its traditional examination of subordi-
nation).
238 See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil
Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black!White Paradigm, 108 YALE
L.J. 2385, 2398 (1999).
239 Id.
240 See Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science
Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 406 (2000) ("[W]e need to know the definition of the ingroup in
a given context .. ").
241 Scholars have observed that trial judges in antidiscrimination cases are disinclined
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ism and postcolonial racial stratification in multiracial societies around
the world gives further context to the premise of racial privilege in multi-
racial/multi-ethnic societies. 242 Another advantage of the MRLA is that it
can identify who is functionally privileged in a given context, without losing
sight of the continuing privilege of self-identified White-Anglos.2 43 Thus,
it does not make the mistake of recasting White-Anglos "as just another
[racial] group competing with many others."2" In this way, the focus on
inter-ethnic disparate treatment claims need not undermine the need to con-
tinue enforcing discrimination claims against White-Anglo defendants.
Similarly, the MRLA is not meant to subvert the enforcement of dispa-
rate impact claims, nor should it diminish an employer's desire to foster a
diverse workplace.24 5
While the multiracial racism lens is an analytical approach that liti-
gators will need to persuade judges to consider, it is not one that requires
the enactment of new laws or other legislative reform.246 Rather, it is a con-
to consider the complexity of racial identity categories. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making
Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 644
(2002). The advantage of the MRLA is that it builds upon pre-existing judicial knowledge
about White racial privilege. It seeks to elucidate the dynamics of inter-ethnic discrimina-
tion by grounding its analysis in the operation of racial privilege rather than the particulari-
ties of how a party to the case racially identifies.
242 See, e.g., COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY: A READER (Patrick
Williams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994).
243 Cf WILDMAN, supra note 233, at 36 ("Privileging of whiteness in the workplace can
occur even when all participants are African American.").
244 Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma
of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1995) (concluding that the
Supreme Court's current equal protection doctrine exploits the changing racial demography
of the United States to transform Whites rhetorically into a victim group like any other).
245 Because this first wave of Latino inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases have
all been litigated as individual disparate treatment claims, this Article focuses upon the
judicial misunderstandings that arise in that context. More empirical data is needed before
an assessment can be made as to whether diverse workplaces also alter the judicial applica-
tion of traditional disparate impact doctrine. Nonetheless, it is quite possible that the
MRLA may have some utility for plaintiffs attempting to prove that an employer's prof-
fered justification for the employment practice in question is a pretext for discrimination.
For instance, in EEOC v. Consolidated Services, 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993), the court
noted the persuasiveness of the employer's expert witness in explaining the cultural factors
that would encourage a Korean-owned business to hire mostly Korean workers to the ex-
clusion of African American workers. If the plaintiff EEOC had deployed the MRLA, it too
could have proffered expert testimony about the pre-existing racial attitudes of Koreans
informing the alleged employment practice of word-of-mouth recruitment. In short, for
those inter-ethnic discrimination plaintiffs able to aggregate the statistical evidence to show a
disparate impact upon their racial or ethnic subgroup from a particular employment prac-
tice, the MRLA may further support the plaintiff's case rather than undermine it. Similarly,
the MRLA does not undermine diversity in the workplace or dispute the overarching value
of diversity in the workplace. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
246 In fact, the request for a judicial inquiry into who is functionally advantaged and
disadvantaged in a specific racial hierarchy resonates with the post-Civil War judicial as-
sessments of who was functionally White or Black for purposes of Jim Crow segregation
enforcement. See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (concluding that a child of
Chinese descent was functionally "colored" and thus not qualified to enroll in Whites-only
public schools); see also IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUC-
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ceptual framework that plaintiffs can use to displace the judicial inclina-
tion towards the diversity defense and its disregard for established legal
doctrine. For instance, if the paradigmatic case of Arrocha v. CUNY, 247 dis-
cussed in Part II of this Article, had been crafted by the plaintiff using the
proposed MRLA, the court would not have summarily dismissed the plain-
tiff's claims of race and national-origin discrimination, because the plaintiff
would have been better able to dispel the judicial enchantment with di-
versity rhetoric by: (1) explicitly foregrounding his narrative with the prem-
ise of inter-ethnic hierarchy and bias; (2) focusing the inquiry on whether
there were racially advantaged and disadvantaged employees among the di-
verse non-White workers; (3) providing the social science data about La-
tino racial attitudes; and (4) demonstrating the applicability of established
employment discrimination doctrine to diverse workplaces. In Arrocha, the
plaintiff's statement that there was a "disturbing culture of favoritism that
favor[ed] the appointments of white Cubans, Spaniards, and white His-
panics from South America" was insufficient to invoke the long legacy of
racial hierarchy in Latin America.248 For a judge focused on an under-
standing of discrimination as solely a U.S. White/non-White phenome-
non, the Arrocha plaintiff needed to present explicit documentation of
racial privilege and bias in non-White contexts. Using the insights of the
multiracial racism lens, the plaintiff would have been more likely to per-
suade the judge to consider the empirical data about Latino racial atti-
tudes and their manifestation. The plaintiff's submission of expert testi-
mony regarding the long legacy of anti-Black bias against Afro-Latinos
within Latin America would have dispelled the judicial inclination to view
Latinos as homogeneous and interchangeable. In turn, the disruption of the
judicial presumption of Latino homogeneity would have eliminated the
rationalization that "[d]iversity in an employer's staff undercuts an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent." '249 Further, established employment discrimi-
nation doctrine would not have been overlooked. Similarly, in other Latino
inter-ethnic discrimination cases in which the plaintiffs are African Ameri-
can, the presentation of empirical information about Latino anti-Black bias
would be useful in dismantling fanciful notions about the inherent har-
mony of a diverse workplace. Furthermore, the scholarly literature ex-
plaining how systemic White privilege encourages non-White racial/ethnic
group members to harbor bias against other non-Whites would also be
useful.25°
TION OF WHITENESS (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1996). Although official Jim
Crow segregation has been abolished, racial hierarchies continue as does the need to ad-
dress the differential employment status of those racially privileged and racially disadvan-
taged.
247 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004).
248 Id. at *7.
249 Id.
250 See supra note 234; see also FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 10-30
(Charles Lam Markmann trans., Grove Press 1967) (describing how subordinated group
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The MRLA is a concept influenced by Charles Lawrence's articula-
tion of a "cultural meaning test." In a 1987 Stanford Law Review article,
he proposed the overt judicial examination of context as a method for recog-
nizing racial meanings and motivations.2 5" ' Lawrence proposed the cul-
tural meaning test as a mechanism for helping judges address the harm of
unconscious racism in the equal protection context. Lawrence suggested
that judges look to the cultural meaning of an allegedly discriminatory gov-
ernmental act as a method for identifying unconscious racism that should
be addressed and subjected to strict scrutiny. This could be done by con-
sidering evidence regarding the historical and social context in which a
governmental decision was made.
Because Lawrence's analysis focused on the racial subordination of
African Americans, his articulation of the cultural meaning test relies upon
the usefulness of considering whether a significant portion of the popula-
tion views a particular action as being of racial import.2 52 In contrast, the
MRLA concerns itself with the racial and ethnic discrimination of which
much of the population in the United States may very well be ignorant. Ac-
cordingly, the MRLA instead encourages the search for cultural meaning
that is outside of the U.S. Jim Crow racial history but serves as its func-
tional equivalent for understanding racial subordination in the inter-ethnic
context.
While no court has ever directly referenced the Charles Lawrence cul-
tural meaning test,253 "much of what judges do entails this kind of inter-
members can internalize the biases of the privileged class and thereby adopt disdain for
other subordinated group members). In contrast, when the EEOC files class actions alleg-
ing that an employer has privileged a particular racial/ethnic group in order to exclude
another racial/ethnic group in its employment decisions, it may instead find the scholarly
literature regarding the strategic positioning of "middleman minorities" more useful for
informing a judge. See, e.g., HUBERT BLALOCK, JR., TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP
RELATIONS 79-84 (1967); Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM.
Soc. REV. 583, 584 (1973). This separate body of literature may be more useful because it
focuses upon a White privileged-class interest in favoring one racial/ethnic group over another.
In contrast, the internalized racism literature focuses upon the racialized attitudes of non-
White racial/ethnic group members and is thus more applicable to establishing a frame-
work for understanding employment discrimination cases in which non-Whites are the
identified agents of discrimination in a workplace dominated by non-Whites.
251 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355-81 (1987) (using cognitive theory to develop
a cultural meaning test for addressing the social harms of unconscious racism).252 
Id. at 356.
253 Courts thus far have only cited Lawrence's article for its discussion of unconscious
racism rather than to apply the proposed cultural meaning test. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 332-33 (1987); Crum v. Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1321 (11 th Cir. 1999);
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS,
22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 827-28 (9th
Cir. 1992); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 863 (10th Cir. 1989); Chin v. Runnels,
343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F.
Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., I F Supp. 2d
783, 801 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); United States v. Burroughs, 897 F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D. Pa.
1995); United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 778-79 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Harris v. Int'l
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pretation: It requires the same skills they employ when they decide a case
by characterizing or interpreting a line of precedent in the way that seems
most true to them.2 54 Moreover, at least one Supreme Court case implic-
itly supports the search for cultural meaning in the manner proposed by
the MRLA. In St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court was presented
with the question of whether a person of Arabian ancestry born in Iraq has
standing to seek protection from racial discrimination under the Section
1981 mandate against racial discrimination in the making of private and
public contracts. 255 The Court refused to decide the case on the fact that un-
der current racial classifications Arabs are Caucasians and thus precluded
from raising a Section 1981 claim that they are not treated like "white
citizens. ' 26 Instead, the Court held that:
Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in concluding
that Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable
classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimina-
tion solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such
discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended
§ 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial
in terms of modern scientific theory. 257
In effect, the Court looked beyond the attempts at formalizing what con-
stitutes a racial group for coverage under discrimination law, and instead
sought to have the law address the reality of racial discrimination in our
more racially and ethnically diverse society. It did this by recognizing
that those often viewed racially as Caucasian, as was the St. Francis Col-
lege plaintiff, can also be treated as non-White depending upon the con-
text.258 The MRLA proposed here would extend that analysis to recogniz-
ing how those often viewed as racially non-White can still exert White privi-
lege in various contexts.
Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515-16 (D. Me. 1991); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467,
503 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State, 110 P.3d 947, 963 (Alaska
2005); State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 575 (Minn. 1994).
254 Lawrence, supra note 251, at 362. "If the jurisprudential task is to give sense to
broad propositions of law-deriving that sense from an ongoing judicial interpretation of
culturally created moral norms-then application of the proposed cultural meaning test is
clearly within the courts' competence." Id. at 386.
211 St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
256 Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination that denies individuals the same rights
"as [are] enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
257481 U.S. at 613.
211 St. Francis College has been relied on to recognize that Jews, Iranians, and Italians
can be protected from racial discrimination under Section 1981 even though they are today
racially classified as Caucasian. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615
(1987) (recognizing Jews as protected under Section 1981); Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d
493 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing Iranians as protected under Section 1981); Bisciglia v.
Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 45 F.3d 223 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing Italians as
protected under Section 1981).
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In order to be able to examine an employment context for racial dis-
crimination in a richer demographic workforce, the MRLA will entail an
engagement with the particularities of how various racial and ethnic groups
have historically treated and continue to stereotype one another. For in-
stance, in the context of Latino inter-ethnic discrimination claims, plain-
tiffs' lawyers would have available to them a vast literature on Latino Stud-
ies259 and Ethnic Studies 26 with which to understand and present such
claims. Such literature would be especially useful in the context of Latino
inter-ethnic discrimination claims as a mechanism to remedy the ill-in-
formed characterizations of Latino racial attitudes that currently pervade
the public discourse and unconsciously influence judges and other legal
decisionmakers.2 1 Legal scholars Laurens Walker and John Monahan de-
scribe this process as the admission of empirical information to construct
a frame of reference for deciding factual issues.26 2 While this is a form of
judicial notice that involves neither legislative facts nor adjudicative facts
as contemplated in Federal Rule of Evidence 201, "a growing number of
courts have held that the use of social frameworks to correct beliefs that
are erroneous does indeed 'assist the trier of fact."'263 This is because the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not bar this third use of social science in
law, 264 thereby allowing a court to admit empirical information "to keep it
responsive to its changing environment. 265
Judges customarily admit empirical information through the use of
expert witnesses for the purpose of assisting a trier of fact to understand the
evidence.266 For instance, judges have accepted the presentation of expert
testimony on the deployment of racial stereotypes in the workplace in order
to disabuse factfinders of what they believe is "common sense. 2 67 In Walker
v. State, a law professor provided expert testimony on behalf of an Afri-
259 See Pedro A. Cabin, Moving from the Margins to Where? Three Decades of La-
tinola Studies, 1 LATINO STUD. 5 (2003) (describing the evolution of Latino Studies).
260 See generally INTRODUCTION To ETHNIC STUDIES: A READER (Phillip Q. Yang ed.,
1999).
261 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and New Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723-25 (2000) (articulating a theory of "in-
stitutional racism" to explain how judges can unconsciously follow elaborate social scripts
that manifest prejudice and racism without a conscious intent to discriminate); see also
LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 135-37
(2006) (describing how discrimination in the legal system can occur by default, due to
legal actors' unconscious biases and resort to automatic racial stereotypes).
262 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Sci-
ence in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 570 (1987) (defining social framework as "the use of
general conclusions from social science research in determining factual issues in a specific
case").
263 Id. at 580.
264 Id. at 582.
265 E.F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 210, 210 (1967).
266 Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 583.
267 SPRIGGS, supra note 145, § 17.03[3][g].
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can American state trooper alleging discriminatory discharge.268 The tes-
timony was based on research in the literature of racial stereotyping that
permitted the expert witness to conclude that it was extremely likely that
the plaintiff was the victim of race-based performance evaluations. Expert
testimony will be especially useful in delineating how Latinos and other
populations of color racialize one another.2 69 Such information would be
presented for the sole purpose of creating a social framework to construct
a frame of reference for deciding the factual issues, and not as a vehicle
for imparting a general group bias to an individual defendant on the legal
question of discriminatory intent.270 In this way, the MRLA will call on
expert witnesses to act in their traditional role of educating the decision-
maker about their areas of expertise.27' One federal district court has already
been very explicit about the need for such expert testimony and litera-
ture.272 As discussed earlier in this section, Ali v. National Bank of Paki-
stan represents what is sure to become a growing dynamic of cases pre-
senting judges with inter-ethnic discrimination claims that they are unable to
assess and evaluate without in-depth assistance from the plaintiff.273 It is
at least encouraging that the judge in Ali expressed a willingness to re-
ceive expert testimony and documentation about systems of racialization
with which he was not familiar. It is in such spaces of willingness that the
multiracial racism lens concept may gain traction in the same manner that
some judges have implicitly and explicitly applied Critical Race Theory in
their analysis of social issues. 274 Once the judiciary is made more aware
of the existence of inter-ethnic discrimination expertise, judges may be-
come more disposed to exercising their discretion to appoint expert wit-
nesses themselves. 275 In addition to using expert witnesses, empirical re-
268 No. EV 87-12-C (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 1987).
269 See WANG supra note 261, at 136-37 (explaining that one way to counteract a fact-
finder's unconscious biases is to present more normative clarity about the role of race in
the case).
270 See FED. R. EVID. 702 (authorizing the use of expert witnesses with specialized knowl-
edge to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence"); see also JOHN WILLIAM STRONG,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 at 50 (1992) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not
permit opinion on law except questions of foreign law ...."); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER
& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 7.7 at 905 (2d ed.
1999) ("[When] parties offer expert testimony on the content of law during the ordinary
course of trial, it is properly rejected.").
271 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 270, § 7.6 at 902 ("Often the best thing an
expert can do is to provide standards or criteria, estimates of feasibility or likelihood, or
descriptions of social frameworks that juries can then constructively use in resolving more
particular issues relating to such things as due care, intent or purpose, and who likely did
what and why.") (emphasis added).27 2 See Ali v. Nat'l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
273 See supra notes 228-232 and accompanying text.
214 See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 109-19 (2001) (describing some cases in which judges have either explicitly or
implicitly used Critical Race Theory in their opinions).
275 See FED. R. EvID. 706 ("[T]he court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed ... and
[Vol. 42
HeinOnline  -- 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 314 2007
Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination
search can be presented in briefs, and later in the proposal for jury in-
structions.21 6 Over time a set of pattern jury instructions could be devel-
oped to standardize the use of a set of social science findings. 277 This will
in turn become useful for those plaintiffs financially unable to obtain ex-
pert witnesses of their own. Given the longstanding use of statistical em-
pirical data in employment discrimination cases to provide context for an
allegation of discrimination, judges should be amenable to the presenta-
tion of other forms of empirical data as well.
With respect to Latino inter-ethnic discrimination claims, plaintiffs will
need not only to develop the record with regard to Latino racial biases,
but also to countermand the misleading public discourse that currently exists
about Latinos and race. 278 Specifically, much of the public discourse about
Latinos and racism has focused on the depiction of a problematic rela-
tionship between Latinos and African Americans and has presented Lati-
nos as racial innocents incapable of racial discrimination. 279 Given the fact
that the vast majority of reported Latino inter-ethnic claims to date in-
volve claims of anti-Black bias, it is especially important to have a more
complete picture of Latino racial attitudes as described in Part I of this
Article. The value of the MRLA, with its attention to racial hierarchy and
privilege in diverse workplace settings, is that it validates the need to submit
empirical information to expand the judicial understanding of how em-
ployment discrimination is manifested amidst workplace diversity.
Because of the long legacy of White/non-White racism in the United
States, discussion of race has rightly focused on the White/non-White para-
digm of U.S. race relations and its effects on civil rights enforcement.
But the changing demographics of the United States mean that we need
to expand the judicial analysis of racism to include considerations of how
groups of color can be complicit and even active agents in discrimination
may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection .... ").
276 Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 588. The model for inserting empirical in-
formation into legal memoranda is the "Brandeis brief." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 98
(5th ed. 1983) ("Form of appellate brief in which economic and social surveys and studies
are included along with legal principles and citations and which takes its name from Louis
D. Brandeis, former Associate Justice of Supreme Court, who used such briefs while prac-
ticing law.").
277 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 597-98.
278 See Sawyer, supra note 234, at 270 (discussing how the public emphasis placed on
"Latinas/os as representative of a new mixed-race America is meant to distance Latinas/os
from Blacks and to redefine race in U.S. society as a concept not so very different from the
Latin American myth of racial democracy, which effectively denies racism by emphasizing
miscegenation").
219 See, e.g., NICOLAS C. VACA, THE PRESUMED ALLIANCE: THE UNSPOKEN CONFLICT
BETWEEN LATINOS AND BLACKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA (2004) (presenting
race relations between African Americans and Latinos as unharmonious because of the
resentment African Americans are presumed to have for Latinos). But see Sawyer, supra
note 234, at 270 (describing how authors like Vaca "overemphasize differences between
Latinas/os and African American and ignore political and ideological convergences . .. [and
also] overemphasize conflict in the service of an assimilationist political agenda").
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against other groups of color. Accordingly, the national dialogue about race
needs to examine each ethnic group's racial attitudes in order to have a
complete picture of race relations in today's United States, and of the grow-
ing dynamic of inter-ethnic civil rights claims. The failure to address the
interplay of diversity discourse and inter-ethnic discrimination claims will
undermine the social importance of equality in the workplace.28 Allow-
ing diversity discourse to proceed unchecked in employment discrimina-
tion cases will leave open the very concrete possibility that employers will
begin to construct their workplaces as "diverse" to ward off lawsuits, while
simultaneously maintaining a racial hierarchy.28 ' The MRLA proposed
here is but one possible method for more effectively navigating the reali-
ties of racism in a multiracial world. The concept seeks to focus judges
on the applicability of established employment discrimination doctrine to
the context of inter-ethnic discrimination. Such an endeavor is imperative
if inter-ethnic discrimination allegations are to receive the full inquiry
that they deserve.
28 0 Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New Opportunities,
104 MIciH. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (2006) ("The black-white binary paradigm of race thus
requires expansion to deal with our increasingly multicultural, multiracial society-and
even, sometimes, to do justice to the black cause.").
281 See Carl G. Cooper, Diversity: Denied, Deferred or Preferred, 107 W. VA. L. REV.
685, 687 (2005) ("[A] diverse workforce cuts down on litigation. It is very difficult when
you have all groups, all racial groups and all kinds of individuals, sexual orientation, dis-
ability, age, all employed by the same employer to mount a successful discrimination law-
suit.").
[A]n anecdotal example is the statement of a Filipino American who, in a recent
interview, said that she and other Asian Americans are promoted to and kept at
low management positions so that they can do the face-to-face firing of African
Americans and Latino employees, thereby immunizing their employers from Title
VII suits; after all, how can one racial minority illegally discriminate against an-
other?
Eric K. Yamamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 495, 497 (1997).
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